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ABSTRACT 
Guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon from 1942 to 1945 was extremely limited by available 
resources and manpower, especially following the mass surrender of U.S. troops in the 
Philippines to Imperial Japan during the surrender at Bataan on April 9th, 1942. By closely 
analyzing the primary accounts of Luzon guerrillas Doyle Decker and Robert Mailheau, I seek to 
confirm, confront, and consider many established expectations of guerrilla warfare, especially 
since much of the established literature espouses a loose set of guidelines for irregular warfare. 
In this paper, I analyze the pre-war Philippines in order to establish the decisive disadvantages 
that American forces were faced with prior to guerrilla warfare, after which these limitations 
were only compounded with the dissolution of U.S. command structure in the Philippines 
following the surrender. I then heavily analyze primary interviews and accounts given by Decker 
and Mailheau in order to present concrete examples of local cooperation, military limitations, 
and environmental hazards that the guerrilla soldiers of the 155th guerrilla unit faced in Central 
Luzon. This study’s purpose is to present a new avenue for analyzing guerrilla tactics through 
individual accounts and case studies, so that the human element of decision-making in such 
strategy can be taken into account more frequently and incorporated into broader discussions of 
guerrilla tactics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 World War II stands as a defining moment in U.S. history for many reasons, particularly 
because of the United States’ transition from relative isolation to an overwhelming global and 
industrial power in less than a decade. The codified image of the U.S. is that of a grand industrial 
power fueled by millions of workers, all unified by a common desire to overcome the shocking 
losses incurred during Japan’s raid on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. The United States 
experienced one of the greatest industrial booms in history on the promise of retaliation against 
Japan, and quickly produced one of the most formidable military machines in the world. Japan’s 
accompanying invasion of the Philippines on December 8th, 1941 however, has failed to garner 
similar interest, and those who defended Bataan from December 1941 to April 1942 held none of 
the advantages that this boom provided. The U.S. defeat was swift and brutal, and those few who 
avoided capture after the surrender on April 9th, 1941 resolved to fight in the surrounding terrain 
of Luzon, Mindanao, and the Visayan Archipelago. Their struggle contrasts bitterly with the 
common image of the U.S. during WWII. U.S. guerrillas in the Philippines were malnourished, 
under-equipped, and under-manned throughout the three years preceding the U.S. military’s 
return in 1944. The story of the guerrillas of Central Luzon in particular demonstrates that for all 
of the U.S.’s industrial progress that was made during the 1940s, it was still a country in 
transition, and the guerrillas experienced every disadvantage and trial posed by that transition.  
 
Context of Japanese Occupation  
For Japan, the invasion of the Philippines in late 1941 was both heavily dependent on and 
coordinated with the strike on Pearl Harbor, and both severed U.S. troops in the Philippines from 
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critical reinforcements and supplies. A combination of defensive weaknesses, upcoming 
independence, and a dependence on naval reinforcements all contributed to the fall of the 
Philippines and the U.S. guerrillas’ ensuing dependence on assistance from civilians. The 
Philippines were a remote zone of exile for decades, a place where rival politicians like Paul 
McNutt and troublesome military personnel such as Douglas MacArthur were sent in order to 
distance them from the mainland United States, either for purposes of political expediency or 
career sabotage.1 Equipment and manpower was sparse, due to both the isolationist atmosphere 
of peacetime and widespread reservations throughout the U.S. about allocating further funds to 
defensive efforts.2 The Philippines were the closest U.S. territory to the Japanese mainland, and 
the imperial expansion of the Japanese in the 1930s necessitated an invasion of the Philippines as 
a jumping-off point for expansion throughout the Pacific. While the defense of the Philippines 
was able to resist the invasion for roughly four months, the Japanese attack pushed into the 
Philippines with great efficiency, and surrender on Bataan came on April 9th, 1942.3   
Following the surrender, hundreds of Filipino and U.S. soldiers were soon brought 
together in small groups in order to be taken to Japanese POW camps in what has become known 
as the Bataan Death March. The Bataan Death March is one of the most emotionally charged 
events of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, and has become a potent symbol of wartime 
cruelty among others such as Nanking, the Holocaust, the Rape of Berlin, and the atomic 
bombing of Japan. Bob Mailheau was one of the soldiers forced to endure the Death March, and 
the brutality that he witnessed stayed with him for decades.4 The occupation years following the 
                                                 
1 Dean J. Kotlowski, “Breaching the Paper Walls: Paul V. McNutt and Jewish Refugees to the Philippines, 1938–
1939,” Diplomatic History, 33 no. 5 (2009), 878.  
2 Kerry Irish, “Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning,” 
The Journal of Military History, 74 (April 2010), 440.  
3 Doyle V. Decker, Why I Joined the Army and How I got to the Philippines (From Postwar Interview with Wayne 
Sanford, 1984), 5.  
4 Wayne L. Sanford, ed., The War Years (Military History Section, Indiana Historical Society, 1984), 1-5. 
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Death March in the Philippines were defined by a chaotic mix of different ethnic populations, 
economic turmoil, and national propaganda, but debates still rage concerning the core factors 
that informed Japan’s conduct.   
Some like historian John Dower cite the idea of the Japanese Yamato race, which 
influenced Japanese policy by automatically placing other cultures like those of Korea, Formosa, 
and the Philippines on a lower societal and cultural level than the Japanese.5 While older books 
such as “Backgrounds of Conflict” published during the 1940s more directly related Japanese 
racial hierarchies to a widespread Japanese belief in the Emperor’s mythical origins, Dower’s 
explanation provides a more societally consistent explanation for the lack of compassion 
exercised by Japanese soldiers who were expected to view other conquered populations as 
inferior.6 One of the most prominent reasons for the Japanese conquest of the Philippines was to 
compensate for the lack of a strong agricultural base in Japan which was needed to feed its 
soldiers and citizenry, and this led to a common tendency to place the agricultural needs of 
Japanese soldiers above that of the local population.78 This did not endear the new government to 
citizens in the Philippines, who had already been promised independence by the U.S. 
government.  
But what of the soldiers who escaped capture? Options were limited, and many were 
trapped on the islands that they had been assigned to either by chance or by choice. The Japanese 
occupation persisted for nearly three years, and many soldiers within Luzon and even relatively 
well-organized regions like Mindanao struggled to counter the Japanese occupation or maintain 
                                                 
5 John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986), 284. 
6 Kurt London, Backgrounds of Conflict; Ideas and Forms in World Politics (New York, 1945), 191.  
7 Carel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Westport, Connecticut, 1951), 
238.  
8 Francis K. Danquah, “Japan's Food Farming Policies in Wartime Southeast Asia: The Philippine Example, 1942-
1944,” Agricultural History, 64 no. 3 (1990), 62. 
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cohesion.9 The individual stories of those who persisted and resisted until the time of their 
liberation or death warrant further analysis, and these individual accounts highlight the inherent 
difficulties of forming guerrilla movements. Organization required stability, and the latter was in 
short supply for months following the surrender. Even in previous U.S. conflicts that involved 
guerrilla warfare, soldiers were mostly confined to the U.S. mainland, and were able to use 
geographical familiarity to their advantage. The Philippines however were not the permanent 
homes of most of the U.S. soldiers who were stranded there, and their lack of familiarity with 
survival techniques nearly resulted in the death of soldiers like Private Doyle Decker in the 
initial weeks of the occupation. Survival and direct resistance in Central Luzon was not always 
simultaneously achievable, and the struggle to survive often proved to be more pressing concern 
than organization.  
 
Historiography of Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines 
Historiographically speaking, within traditional military accounts of the Pacific War the 
Philippines are mostly discussed in terms of their strategic location, and their fall is attributed to 
the U.S. Navy’s failure to reinforce and resupply soldiers during the Japanese invasion due to 
both the losses sustained at Pearl Harbor and the coordination of the Japanese strike.10 While 
some historians such as Richard Connaughton and Kerry Irish have written works that focus 
more on popular figures like Douglas MacArthur (especially Connaughton, who has written 
multiple books on the subject), they usually concern the pre-occupation Philippines or focus on 
higher-level leaders in guerrilla warfare rather than the everyday soldiers who carried out their 
orders. While some works that more specifically focus on irregular warfare by historians like 
                                                 
9 David W. Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington D.C., 1992), 70-73. 
10 Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: the First Two Years (Washington D.C., 1962), 99.  
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David Hogan have stated that MacArthur planned on the potential need for guerrilla warfare in 
the Philippines (setting up networks with local planters, etc.), Hogan himself admits that his 
capacity to do this was limited by the U.S. army’s lack of a dedicated doctrine or preparation 
regarding guerrilla warfare.11 U.S. soldiers in the Philippines were prepared to resort to guerrilla 
warfare when the time came to surrender or flee, but had no formal preparation to do so, which 
cost them in the opening weeks as they struggled to procure food and navigate through jungle 
and mountain terrain.  
The Bataan Death March and invasion of the Philippines are common historiographical 
topics of interest, but the guerrilla warfare that followed is seldom covered outside of scattered 
and generalized descriptions of larger-scale movements and supply operations.12 Efforts are often 
made to mention guerrilla warfare in the Philippines within works about World War 2 in the 
Pacific and in larger studies of guerrilla warfare, but there are fewer works that exclusively focus 
on World War 2 in the Philippines or Central Luzon. I am mostly responding to more 
generalized military and social histories, such as the military history work of Louis Morton and 
the numerous smaller histories that have been told regarding individual soldiers or families in the 
Philippines. Many authors take the social history approach or write historical fiction within the 
Philippines, such as “The Crucible: an Autobiography by Colonel Yay” which have told more 
individualized stories with a secondary focus on analysis.13  
In many ways, U.S. guerrillas in the Philippines occupy an interesting space within 
schemes of irregular warfare. Authors frame irregular warfare in different ways, and while some 
                                                 
11 Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 65.  
12 Ibid 70, 74.  
Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington D.C., 1953), 503. 
13 Panlilio Yay, The Crucible: An Autobiography by Colonel Yay, Filipina American Guerrilla (New Brunswick, 
2010).  
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like Max Boot contend that irregular warfare is personality-based around leaders such as Robert 
the Bruce and Mao Zedong, others define irregular warfare by the complete absence of an 
official command structure.14 In addition, while writers on the subject such as Colonel Napoleon 
Valeriano (writing from a counter-guerrilla Filipino perspective) contend that motivations for 
irregular warfare are often rooted in a desire to overthrow an ideologically weak state, soldiers 
like Bob Mailheau and Doyle Decker fought initially to avoid surrender rather than overthrow 
the occupation.15 Based on Mailheau and Decker’s accounts, they were focused more on survival 
than creating a widespread rebellion focused on wresting control of the islands from the Japanese 
(often because the latter goal was much more unrealistic), and while their resistance meets much 
of the criteria prescribed by historians like Russell Crandall (such as a lack of a clear hierarchy, 
diplomatic engagement, or not acting as representatives of their state), their descriptions also 
deviate in significant ways.16 Instead of serving as the initial plan of the United States, guerrilla 
warfare was a strategy that individual soldiers employed after defeat in order to survive and 
subsist until the U.S. returned.17  
 
Approach and Sources:  
My approach will primarily concern Mailheau and Decker’s experiences, and what they 
reveal about guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon after the fall of the Philippines. Avoidance, 
concealment, and relationships with civilians are the primary strategies described in said 
accounts, and violence was often only employed by necessity. While the aforementioned 
                                                 
14 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: an Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York, 
2013), xxi. 
15 Napoleon Valeriano, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York, 1962), 9.  
16 Russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror (New York, 2014), 7. 
17 Ibid, 7.  
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qualifications for irregular warfare that have been provided in works like Crandall’s book 
“America’s Dirty Wars” are useful for the purposes of definition, analyzing the reasons that 
irregular warfare was employed in the Philippines help distinguish the U.S. guerrillas from 
common patterns of irregular warfare. While in normal military circumstances irregular warfare 
is often a carefully considered option, in the Philippines it was a necessity for the displaced 
remnants of a defeated army. For example, while Crandall’s qualification that irregular warfare 
involves the lack of an official command structure is useful, Decker’s account specifically 
illustrates that the former chain of command mattered much less than individual merit after the 
surrender, which specifically addresses Crandall’s theory. While in many respects the guerrillas 
of Central Luzon meet the accepted qualifications of irregular warfare, the reasons that they met 
those criteria provide a more personal point of analysis through which to view the often under-
manned guerrilla movements of the Philippines.  
The purpose of my first section is to provide context for the dire circumstances 
experienced by guerrilla fighters in the Philippines from 1941-45, and to then present the 
experiences of soldiers Bob Mailheau and Doyle Decker in Central Luzon in my second and 
third sections. My primary body of sources consists of several interviews with Mailheau and 
Decker conducted by historian Wayne Sanford in the 1980s, in which they offer their 
experiences and perspective on the war and their time in the Philippines. For example, Decker 
stated that he joined the army primarily so that he could have a job and support his family, and 
was assigned to the Philippines rather than being able to choose his posting.18 These details 
partially explain Decker’s initial shock at Japan’s invasion, as well as his constant focus on 
survival. Bob Mailheau conversely stated that he joined the army out of fears of military 
                                                 
18 Malcolm D. Decker, Essential Commentary Made by Doyle Decker (From “Transcription of Tape,” April 4, 
1984), 1.  
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expansion in Germany, voluntarily choosing the Philippines as a posting far from potential 
German-American conflict.19 While Mailheau’s reasoning was more motivated by worldwide 
factors, he still viewed the Philippines as remote and averse to conflict, which further emphasizes 
the Philippines’ status as a remote territory in U.S. jurisdiction. While both Decker and Mailheau 
eventually joined together in the 155th guerrilla unit, both were forced to resist as a matter of 
survival in an unfamiliar region long before any talk of organization could be made a reality. 
Their accounts are specific to Luzon, so they can only speak to the levels of communication and 
supplies present where they were, and the specificity of my primary sources means that I will be 
discussing guerrilla warfare in Luzon rather than warfare in other regions like Mindanao.  
One of the more significant sources that I will use is a series of transcribed journal entries 
written by Decker throughout his time in the Philippines. These entries are primarily useful for 
their accounts of aid from civilian sources and Decker’s commentary concerning his efforts to 
survive. In addition, Decker’s focus on food supplies is constant (much more than concerns of 
ammunition or other weaponry), and this again indicates that survival was a more pertinent 
factor to him than continued military sabotage and resistance. He distinguishes several sources of 
aid throughout his account, among them aid from the Fassoth family in the form of a stable camp 
for U.S. guerrillas to stay at and various Filipino and Negrito sources that vary from one-time 
transactions of money in exchange for “cigarettes, sugar and rice” to being contacted by a 
guerrilla leader in Manila.20 His accounts describe a life constantly on the move prior to finding 
Mailheau, and the first two years of his foray into Luzon were fraught with confusion, caution, 
and a constantly shifting roster of fellow guerrillas.  
                                                 
19 Wayne L. Sanford, ed., Resistance on Luzon: Narratives by: Robert T. Mailheau (Military History Section, 
Indiana Historical Society, 1984), 2. 
20 Doyle V. Decker, Doyle Decker’s Journal Entries in the Philippines (From Transcription conducted by Malcolm 
Decker), 13, 36.  
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I am mostly interpreting my sources for the purposes of understanding the soldiers’ 
survival techniques as well as the numerous difficulties they encountered attempting to form 
larger groups. Survival was their top priority in many cases, and their accounts indicate that the 
guerrillas constantly roamed from place to place, with only brief pauses at locations like 
Fassoth’s Camp.21 In addition, the interviews taken after the fact are useful for understanding the 
war’s longer-term impact on Decker and Mailheau, as well as their perspectives in retrospect. I 
can compare larger-scale claims from secondary works on guerrilla warfare to the perspectives 
of the guerrillas themselves, and analyze discrepancies or consistent aspects. For example, while 
books like “The Philippines and the United States” detail the struggles of the U.S. and Japanese 
governments to secure the aid of local populations through promises of independence, the shelter 
and navigational aid provided by Fassoth’s camp and local tribesmen that is described in 
Decker’s account indicates that U.S. guerrillas were helped by multiple class groups in the 
Philippines (specifically Luzon) throughout their survival in the jungle.22 Specific examples like 
these help to more concretely demonstrate the relationships that the guerrillas had with different 
groups around them, and the situations in which these relationships were formed.  
 
Conclusion 
 Decker and Mailheau’s experiences demonstrate that guerrilla warfare can be just as 
unfamiliar and daunting to the guerrillas themselves as it is for the enemy tasked with countering 
it. While their knowledge of local terrain grew over time, both soldiers were caught off guard by 
the sudden victory of the Japanese, as well as the failure of the U.S. government to provide 
support until late 1944. Japan’s foothold in the Southwest Pacific was solidified by victories in 
                                                 
21 Ibid, 24. 
22 Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 247.  
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the Philippines, Borneo, and China, and had the resources necessary to maintain a grip on their 
new territories (see Figure 1, the “Map of the Southwest Pacific” on page 11 for geographical 
reference to these four locations). Decker and Mailheau were forced to improvise constantly in 
Central Luzon (shown within the Philippine islands in Figure 2, “Map of the Philippines, 1944”) 
, and while there were glimmers of ingenuity, many of their earlier efforts resulted in painful 
lessons that nearly killed them, and were only salvaged by the generosity and skills of the 
disparate groups who supported them. Without the contributions that Filipino and Negrito 
populations made, neither Decker or Mailheau would have survived the war or formed the 155th 
guerrilla unit, and their examples demonstrate the necessity of support more clearly than other, 
larger-scale analyses can. My sources will primarily consist of Decker and Mailheau’s account 
(many thanks go to my grandfather, without whom I would not have access to transcriptions of 
these accounts), and while this will not be a comprehensive account of guerrilla warfare in the 
Philippines, it will hopefully provide some insight into the numerous daily challenges involved 
with waging it.  
 11 
23Figure 1. Map of the Southwest Pacific, 1942, including the Philippines, China, Australia, and 
the Southern tip of Japan 
 
                                                 
23 Charles R. Anderson, “Map of Southwest Pacific Area, 1942,” Archives.gov, accessed December 21st, 2019, 
https://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/philippine/maps.html.  
 12 
24 
Figure 2. Map of the Philippines, 1944, including Luzon, Bataan, and Corregidor.
                                                 
24 Leyte Center for Military History Brochure, “Map of the Philippines, 1944,” Archives.gov, accessed December 
21st, 2019, https://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/philippine/maps.html.  
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GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE PHILIPPINES: BROKEN DEFENSES AND THE 
WAR FOR SUPPORT 
 
 The harsh conditions that soldiers Doyle Decker and Robert “Bob” Mailheau faced from 
1941 to 1945 in the Philippines were the result of decades of uncertain rule by the U.S. and 
burgeoning Japanese military expansion. When Japan invaded the Philippines on December 8th, 
1941, the island chain’s defenders were woefully underprepared, and lacked the necessary 
equipment, support, and manpower that they needed. By April 1942, Japan secured military 
victory in the Philippines, and the few remaining U.S. soldiers who refused to surrender were 
forced to retreat into the surrounding mountainsides and jungles in order to conduct guerrilla 
warfare. Guerrilla warfare had not been officially prepared as part of the U.S.-Pacific strategy, 
but was instead used by soldiers as a means of survival. The complete absence of official 
military support throughout the Japanese occupation of the Philippines was a direct result of both 
inadequate defensive planning and the Philippines’ political placement within the United States, 
both of which made the Philippines an easy military target for Japan. Japan achieved victory 
through both its own military efficiency and the weakness of the United States’ hold over the 
Philippines, and the guerrilla warfare employed by U.S. soldiers was a matter of necessity 
created by disastrous defeat.  
 
Guerrilla Warfare: Tenets and Reasoning 
 First, it is important to clarify what the term guerrilla warfare implies as it is used here, 
since it has become a broad label with several interpretations. While there are several terms for it 
including guerrilla warfare, irregular warfare, and insurgent warfare, the most consistent 
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characteristic of the term is the use of non-traditional tactics in order to compensate for military 
disadvantages.25 The term “non-traditional” is highly subjective, but it is mostly used in 
reference to standards of official warfare given by the Geneva Convention, such as clear military 
hierarchies, openly carried weapons, and adherence to international rules of war.26 Groups have 
embraced guerrilla warfare for a wide variety of reasons, but it is almost always utilized as an 
alternative to traditional warfare when facing a militarily superior opponent that would be 
difficult to defeat conventionally. 27 The measures employed by guerrillas defy both strict 
military hierarchies and the Geneva Convention’s given characteristics (including the 
abandonment of open military dress, openly carried firearms, and other markers of official 
military status), and these measures are utilized to overcome disparities in military power, either 
through forcing a political stalemate or whittling down opposing forces throughout a prolonged 
period of time.28 
 The character or ethical nature of guerrilla warfare has also been a matter of debate, and 
the ideological nature of many guerrilla movements such as the Viet Cong, Mujahedeen, and Al 
Qaeda have tied guerrilla warfare to strong ideologies by association.29 However, while this 
ideological association and extremism are consistent components of guerrilla warfare, it is not 
required for guerrilla warfare to be employed. Survival is as strong as a motivation as any 
political inspiration to instill reform or instill a new government, and survival was a constant 
challenge during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some modern interpretations also 
associate guerrilla with a kind of “romantic” thrill that attracts younger recruits, who are worn 
                                                 
25 Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars, 7. 
26 Ibid, 7. 
27 Anthony James Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency (Westport, Connecticut), 6.  
28 Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington D.C., 2009), ix.   
29 Valeriano, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, 5.  
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down over time by the hardships of survival.30 This kind of initially romantic view, however, is 
not readily apparent in primary accounts that describe guerrilla warfare on Luzon, and the 
struggle to merely survive repeatedly plagued U.S. soldiers even prior to the occupation. Food 
ran low constantly, disease ran rampant, and tensions ran high, and many of these problems were 
apparent early on as soldiers scrambled to retreat into the mountains and jungles of the 
Philippines.31 Securing sufficient food and ammunition had been a constant issue even during the 
defense of Bataan weeks before the surrender, and this lack of basic necessities did not 
encourage a romantic view of the situation. The Luzon Guerrillas’ situation following the U.S.’ 
surrender was dire, and rather than instilling a new government, their initial goals were to 
survive and establish a somewhat stable environment to operate from.  
 Guerrilla warfare in the Philippines was not initially planned, but instead arose from the 
chaos following Japan’s invasion. For many U.S. soldiers stranded on Luzon after the army’s 
surrender, guerrilla warfare was one of the only options for survival, and chose to employ it out 
of pragmatism rather than extremism. Many recent writers on guerrilla warfare associate 21st 
century guerrilla warfare primarily with either underdeveloped societies or insurgencies, but 
guerrillas in the Philippines were the remnants of the defeated army of a major world power.32 
The defense of the Philippines in December 1941 began with a meager amount of military 
resources and ended with the complete dismantling of the U.S. chain of command, leaving 
soldiers to fend for themselves in order to survive. Guerrilla warfare as a means of survival or as 
an alternative to surrender is tricky to define, since the difference between group-scale survival 
and dedicated resistance is subjective at best. While writers on guerrilla warfare often 
                                                 
30 Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency, 7. 
31 Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 257.  
32 Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars, 8.  
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acknowledge the importance of individuals maintaining a steady food supply and base of 
operation, they often do so in passing rather than analyzing the true importance of a stable 
environment in creating guerrilla cells.33 Luzon guerrillas were not strongly motivated by strong 
ideological concerns such as forming a new government independent from the U.S. or Japan, but 
were instead focused on establishing moderately stable conditions in order to more effectively 
survive and coordinate stranded soldiers.   
 
Struggle for Control: The U.S. in the Philippines 
One of the essential reasons that the United States’ defeat in the Philippines was so swift 
was that the islands were on the verge of independence in 1941, and had already been considered 
remote in terms of both geography and administration. By the time of the invasion on December 
8th, 1941, the United States possessed the Philippine Islands as a colonial territory since 1898, 
when it acquired them from the Spanish following U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War. 
The Treaty of Paris, ratified by the Spanish in 1898, ceded the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, 
and a number of other assorted Spanish colonial possessions to the U.S., which dramatically 
increased the country’s role in global affairs and trade despite its isolationist identity.34 However, 
while the U.S. was granted legal control of the Philippines, a number of problems arose when 
U.S. rule was resisted throughout 1898 and the early 1900s. The forces of Filipino resistance 
leader Emilio Aguinaldo had already employed guerrilla warfare for years to resist Spanish rule 
before the U.S. was granted legal control, and had already declared an independent Philippine 
Republic by 1898.35 The U.S. now had to conquer sovereign territory in order to maintain its 
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claim to the Philippines, and the same guerrilla tactics that had been used by Aguinaldo’s forces 
to defeat the Spanish were now employed against the newly arriving U.S. army, which ironically 
employed similar tactics against the Japanese nearly five decades later.  
The guerrilla tactics used against the U.S. during the Philippine-American War were 
nearly textbook examples, and were much more organized than the initial resistance of U.S. 
guerrillas towards the Japanese in mid-1941. Resistance forces under General Aguinaldo often 
avoided open confrontation, and preferred consistent military harassment over large-scale 
conflicts with the U.S. army. Choosing the time, place, and pace of combat is one of the core 
tenets of guerrilla warfare, and Aguinaldo’s forces were already familiar with resisting larger 
military powers.36 The U.S. army’s answer to this tactic was a “seek-and-destroy” mentality, 
which ultimately resulted in additional civilian casualties and failed to contribute to a longer-
term military strategy.37 While the U.S. sought a decisive battle, Philippine resistance forces 
were unwilling to fight conventional battles, increasing the frustration of U.S. army forces in the 
Philippines. The U.S. army presented an enormous threat in open combat, so resorting to every 
available advantage was the only option for the revolutionaries. While this worked in the short 
term, it also meant that the U.S. army was now aware of the Philippine forces’ unwillingness to 
fight openly, and the army employed extreme methods to counter it. 
While the U.S. was able to knock out several military targets throughout the initial 
fighting in 1899 with relative ease, little effort was made to form or enact any long-term 
strategy.38 Victory was defined by the defeat of the enemy instead of fulfilling tactical objectives, 
which was an unwise doctrine to employ against a guerrilla force determined to prosecute a 
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prolonged conflict of attrition.39 In addition, the U.S. did not have the necessary interpreters or 
experience to adequately communicate with the civilian population in the Philippines, severely 
limiting its ability to establish working relationships or compromise instead of applying further 
military force.40 Even if U.S. intentions had been inherently peaceful, the restlessness of soldiers 
combined with the experiences of many commanders in the Indian Wars and the inherent 
frustration caused by guerrilla warfare resulted in an extremely brutal conflict marked by mass 
killings and bloody displays of military force.41 By 1902, the U.S. had quashed Aguinaldo’s 
resistance and secured the majority of the Philippines despite making several key mistakes, but 
its rule throughout the following decades was distant and reluctant. Despite the force employed 
to conquer the Philippines, the new territorial government struggled to reconcile its colonial rule 
with traditional U.S. ideals of sovereignty for nearly forty years.  
While the U.S. and Japanese invasions both involved extreme amounts of violence, the 
critical difference was that the U.S. had the time to capitalize on its conquest. Through the 
successful implementation of the Monroe doctrine, the U.S. was able to stave off foreign 
interference while strategically projecting its interests at home and overseas, which was one of 
the many reasons that it was able to maintain control over its territories. While the U.S. used the 
Philippines for cash crops and built its own systems of education and trade in the region, it had 
nearly five decades to form institutions in order to reinforce its rule without direct competition 
from other empires. Japan lacked this period of uninterrupted development after it conquered the 
Philippines in 1941, and ultimately had less than four years to accomplish what the U.S. had in 
over forty. The U.S. occupation of the Philippines was not benevolent, but was definitively 
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fading by 1934 with a direct legal promise of independence, a promise not granted to other U.S. 
colonies such as Guam and Puerto Rico.  
Once it had mostly eliminated resistance in the Philippines, the U.S. government formed 
a territorial government rather than admitting the Philippines to the Union as an incorporated 
state, which is one reason why the Philippines were never widely viewed as a true part of the 
U.S. by many in the continental U.S..42 While statehood for continental territories was similarly 
convoluted (especially throughout the Southwestern United States), the Philippines’ geographic 
remoteness contributed to its perception as an irrelevant and distant possession, and 
congressional debates regarding “the Philippine Problem” of the territory’s right to sovereignty 
continued throughout the early 1900s.43 Prior to the passing of the Tydings-McDuffie act in 
1934, stateside debates over the granting of Philippine independence consisted of political 
posturing with little effect. While congressional Democrats generally advocated for the 
independence of the Philippines from 1898 to 1911, it was little more than a symbolic gesture 
without a majority in either the House of Representatives or the Senate.44 Even when pro-
independence Democrats secured a house majority and presidential victory through the election 
of Woodrow Wilson in 1913, the U.S. government still could not reach an agreement regarding 
independence by the end of Wilson’s term. Advances were made in smaller concessions such as 
trade agreements and export taxes through legislative policies like the Jones act in 1916, but the 
core problem of colonial rule by the U.S. went unresolved until the passage of the Tydings-
McDuffie Act in 1934.45 
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By 1934, the U.S. government finally expressed a concrete desire to grant the Philippines 
independence, and began to reduce its defensive military presence in the process, which in turn 
was one of the key reasons that Japan was able to defeat the U.S. defenses so swiftly. The 
passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act was a critical moment for the U.S. administration, since it 
expressly promised independence to the Philippines by 1946.46 During the U.S. invasion of the 
Philippines in 1898, Philippine hopes of independence were facilitated by General Aguinaldo’s 
resistance after negotiations between Spain and the Philippines worsened in 1897.47 By 1941, the 
U.S. issued a legal promise of independence, and while there was arguably no guarantee that the 
U.S. would honor its agreement, the Tydings-McDuffie act was the most direct contract that the 
U.S. could legally make. While the U.S. tenure in the Philippines from 1898 to 1946 was 
relatively short, it still took nearly forty years to shift from U.S. colonial rule to Philippine 
independence, and this meant that the Japanese invasion of 1941 struck at a vulnerable point 
during the transition to independence. This interruption was one of the key reasons that defenses 
in the Philippines were weakened when Japan invaded in December 1941, but was also one of 
the reasons that Japanese rule encountered numerous difficulties from April 1942 to 1945.  
 
The Defensive Situation in 1941: Military Capabilities 
 Just prior to the Japanese invasion at the end of 1941, the defensive capabilities of the 
U.S. army in the Philippines were very limited in terms of both available manpower and 
modernized equipment. Throughout the early 20th century the defense of the Philippines was 
hampered by available defensive budgets and the overall Pacific strategy of the U.S., and U.S. 
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Pacific planners quickly believed that a total defense of the Philippines was untenable.48 Plans 
were made to establish a more significant air presence in order to compensate for the 
Philippines’ dependence on naval support, but the invasion struck before any meaningful number 
of planes could be transferred. As early as 1926, the Joint Board of the army and Navy 
(established in 1903) had begun to advocate for a strategy based more on strategic bombing and 
naval capability than the use of the Philippines as a hub within the Pacific, and adopted a 
defensive posture that shaped the Philippines into a military choke point.49 Regardless of the 
inherent difficulties of securing funds during peacetime, the Philippines were placed in a 
precarious position within the U.S. Pacific strategy, and were left vulnerable.  
The budget for the defense of the Philippines was very limited compared to the strategic 
aims of Philippine officials such as Major Dwight Eisenhower and General Douglas MacArthur, 
who was appointed as Military Advisor to the Philippines in fall 1935.50 Despite attempts to 
secure an effective defense budget from the National Assembly of the Philippines, financial 
limitations continued to hound the defensive development of U.S. army forces in the islands, and 
throughout his tenure as Military Adviser, MacArthur was unable to meaningfully improve 
defenses in the Philippines prior to the invasion in 1941.51 Even a proposition by General 
MacArthur to train 20,000 Filipino volunteer soldiers at the beginning of 1937 was deemed 
impractical by Eisenhower, who realized that the 1936 defense budget for the Philippines had 
left no room for training, paying, or arming such a force.52 To put this in perspective, the U.S. 
army estimated that Japan could “transport to the Philippines a force of 300,000 men in 30 
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days… (while) the Americans would then have to meet this attack with… 11,000 troops of which 
7,000 were Filipinos…”53 Simply put, the gap in numbers alone left defensive forces in the 
islands very vulnerable without sufficient naval support and reinforcements, and attempts to 
lessen the gap as well as develop the Philippines’ base of manpower rather than committing U.S. 
troops were unsuccessful or unsupported.  
Reasons for the aforementioned reductions in budgets vary, but arguments for increased 
funds proved difficult to make throughout the inter-war years. Undoubtedly, however, the 
relative lack of funding was a result of both the Philippines’ upcoming independence and the 
peacetime priorities of the U.S. government. The Philippines were set for independence in 1946 
via the Tydings-McDuffie act, meaning that direct U.S. investment in establishing longer-term 
defenses was inherently limited, and investment in future defenses did not directly benefit the 
U.S.. Any military assets such as defensive fortifications would be lost in a decade aside from a 
few scattered “naval reservations and refueling stations”, limiting the United States’ long-term 
military investment in the region.54 This also hindered efforts to divert more U.S. troops to the 
Philippines than was strictly necessary, which was one of the many reasons that MacArthur 
attempted to expand the role of local volunteers with mixed success. Without any long-term 
incentive to develop the Philippines defensively, the U.S. adapted its overall Pacific strategy, 
which left the islands vulnerable to attack from superior air and naval power. The Japanese had 
both, and existing U.S. defenses were inadequate without support from allied ships.   
 Air power in the Philippines was also in a transitional stage during late 1941, and could 
not adequately match Japan’s world class air force on its own. While the existing transfers of 
                                                 
53 Morton, Strategy and Command, 34.  
54 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government : Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill, 
2006), 425; History, Art and Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, Asian and Pacific 
Islander Americans in Congress, 1900–2017, The Philippines, 1898–1946 (Washington, D.C., 2018).  
 23 
 
planes conducted by the U.S. army could have potentially given the Philippines impressive 
offensive capability in a matter of years, the process was far from complete and defensive 
airpower was completely outclassed.55 Even relatively modern planes such as P-35 fighters and 
B-17 Flying Fortress bombers were only available in very limited numbers, and less than half of 
the over 300 aircraft stationed in the Philippines were even “suitable for combat.”56 Clark airfield 
(which was north of Manila) was the only airfield capable of housing and utilizing available 
heavy bombers like the B-17, of which there were only 35.57 By the Army Air Force’s given 
estimates, there were 35 heavy bombers, 90 operational “pursuit planes” (which would later be 
re-dubbed fighter planes), 12 older and outdated fighter planes, and 21 other miscellaneous 
aircraft.58 By 1941, the Zero fighter utilized by Japan had already proven itself to be extremely 
competent and capable of destroying larger forces of lesser quality in a matter of weeks. Against 
China’s limited air force in 1937, “approximately thirty Zeros accounted for 266 confirmed 
kills,” one of several proving grounds in which the Japanese army achieved a great deal of 
success.59 Thus, the Philippines were left vulnerable, as even the air power that was expected to 
compensate for reduced naval assets was extremely limited and failed to significantly aid the 
defense of the Philippines in 1941.  
 These numerous problems related to budgeting, supplies, and the approaching 
independence of the region also affected attempts to rebuild local forces. While General 
MacArthur made attempts to substantially develop the Philippine army through conscription, his 
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plans were hampered by all of the aforementioned problems.60 The reluctance of the Philippine 
or U.S. governments to provide more substantial resources meant that even establishing training 
facilities was difficult, which crippled basic efforts to create a sustainable defense force.61 
Additionally, standard equipment was also poor among U.S. soldiers (including many WWI-era 
rifles such as the Enfield and M1906 Springfield Rifles), and the Philippine army did not receive 
much better.62 Japan’s military (the army specifically) had already proven that it could defeat 
foes with similar equipment when it battled Nationalist Chinese forces, who had also used a 
loose collection of outdated equipment.   
Opinions regarding the possibility of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines were also 
mixed at best. While news of the Japanese invasions of China and Manchuria had reached some 
Chinese-Filipino populations in the area who later resisted Japanese rule, it took time for 
American soldiers like Bob Mailheau to realize that the Philippines were a viable military target 
for Japan.63 Prior to the outbreak of war in the Philippines, the Chinese community resisted 
Japan’s invasion by donating to the “salvation movement,” a financial cause formed by overseas 
Chinese populations in order to aid anti-Japanese defensive efforts following the invasion of 
China in 1937.64 Anti-Japanese sentiment rose alongside further Japanese invasions like 
Manchuria and especially China among the Filipino-Chinese community, and this sentiment 
could even be measured economically (by some estimates over $2,000,000 worth of funds had 
been donated to defensive efforts against the Japanese in Manchuria by the Philippine Chinese 
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alone).65 Despite this, only specific groups like the Chinese-Filipino population directly 
considered a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, and even in light of Japan’s military buildup 
and the U.S. government’s responses like the oil embargo, many were unprepared for a direct 
attack.  
 Simply put, all of these factors meant that the U.S. was unable to adequately prepare the 
Philippines (specifically Luzon and Bataan) for the Japanese invasion in December 1941. The 
Japanese army had proven its offensive capabilities in Manchuria and China, and considering the 
Philippine defense’s resources, had a clear military advantage. The approaching independence of 
the Philippines lessened potential investment in its defense, and the United States’ overall Pacific 
strategy was devised to work around the Philippines’ air complement and reinforcements from 
the U.S. Navy, which was destroyed at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, one day before the 
invasion of the Philippines. While defeat was not certain, the coordination and rapidity of the 
Japanese assault on both the Philippines and Pearl Harbor meant that both American and 
Philippine forces on the island faced a very steep challenge, and had to face a highly competent 
and well-equipped Japanese invasion force with outdated equipment, limited aerial support, and 
(most crucially) an inability to receive the supplies than most of their defense strategy was built 
around. Circumstances were not in the U.S. army’s favor, and too many elements of the 
Philippines’ defense were compromised in one or more critical ways.  
 
Japanese Motivations and Reputation Prior to the Invasion  
 Despite the numerous defensive weaknesses of the Philippines, a Japanese invasion was 
not a foregone conclusion in 1941, even in light of its earlier military expansion throughout East 
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Asia during the 1930s. However, Japan’s growing economic dependence on foreign materials 
and proximity to the Philippines contributed significantly to the selection of the Philippines as a 
military target. Additionally, the Philippines were a prime target for its geographical position, its 
economic resources, and its numerous defensive weaknesses. Japan’s invasions of Manchuria 
and China in 1931 and 1937 respectively had already demonstrated its willingness to dismiss 
global opinion, and an oil embargo by the U.S. only compounded the strategic importance of 
Japanese expansion. In addition, while defensive buildup in the Philippines was limited, the U.S. 
was beginning to assemble a bomber complement in the Philippines that would be dangerous to 
Japanese naval forces if allowed to continue unabated.66 Following a U.S. oil embargo in the 
summer of 1940, Japan had more than adequate motivation to commence with a military strike, 
and the failure of U.S. planners to recognize these motivations only accelerated the Japanese 
conquest of the islands.67  
While Japanese expansion became directly relevant to the U.S. following the attacks on 
Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in December 1941, it had already been prevalent in Asia 
throughout the 1930s.68 Japanese expansion began at least as early as the invasion of Manchuria 
in 1931 and arguably extended back to the annexation of Korea in 1910. While Japan both 
invaded and secured territory at an alarming pace throughout the 1930s, it was severely limited 
by its dependence on foreign oil, a critical strategic weakness that became much more 
pronounced after the U.S. oil embargo in 1940.69 While Japan proved that it could easily act in 
spite of international opinion (particularly the ineffectual League of Nations) during the invasion 
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of Manchuria, it was still dependent enough on foreign resources that it could not engage in 
rampant militarism without consequence. Japan’s goal was to become militarily and 
economically self-sufficient, and in order to do so it could not stop at Manchuria and China. 
Conquering the Philippines fulfilled several of Japan’s military and diplomatic objectives, 
including securing a point of invasion for other surrounding islands like Borneo, conquering an 
isolated target free of initial influence from U.S. naval forces, and expanding Japan’s evolving 
economic sphere.70  
Japan’s primary motivation for its expansion into Asia during WWII has been debated 
endlessly, but the desire to oust Western influence from the region and assert the Japanese 
empire as the savior of Asia was one of the most prominent. One of Japan’s goals was to create 
buffer zones against Western empires, and the Pan-Asian state that Japan was attempting to form 
was part of their greater effort to oust these empires that were viewed as invasive interlopers.71 
By establishing a network of allied powers across Europe and expanding its own influence 
throughout Asia, Japan would create a shield against foreign intervention and enable itself to 
promote its interests unhindered by western interventionism. The largest of these “buffers” 
would have consisted of Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. While this may seem a 
contradictory combination given Germany’s later incursion into the Soviet Union and the long-
standing rivalry between Japan and Russia, at the time this choice of allies had a fair degree of 
merit. The Soviets had signed non-aggression pacts with the others, and the geographical 
locations of Japan’s various allies would place a zone of protection around the entirety of 
Japan.72 
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 For these reasons as well as many others, Japan decided to invade the Philippines, thus 
provoking the entry of the U.S. into WWII. One of the primary reasons for invading the 
Philippines was to procure a more stable food supply and to incorporate the Philippines into a 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.73 Following the invasion of French Indo-China in 
September 1940, Japan was economically crippled by the ensuing U.S. oil embargo, meaning 
that Japan was now on a strict time limit if it could not become self-sufficient.74 These issues of 
supply and consumption meant that Japanese strategy (particularly by the army) now had to rely 
much more on the conservation of military resources and constantly conquering resource-rich 
areas in order to sustain Japan’s military machine. The Japanese army and navy disagreed on 
how to address these shortages. The Navy advocated for more cautious plans while the army 
tended to argue for speed and decisive strikes.75 The overriding consensus between the two 
branches, however, was that a protracted conflict with the U.S. would be impractical, and that 
that to prevail the Japanese military would have to secure victory quickly and decisively. Japan’s 
strategy in the southeast Pacific revolved around establishing control over the Philippines and 
using it as a base to advance “step-by-step” through nearby regions, including Borneo, Java, 
Sumatra, and Malaya, whose natural resources (especially petroleum) were essential for 
sustaining Japan’s military machine.76  
 The Philippines were included as a target in most of Japan’s military plans, and the 
combination of its geographical location with the relative weakness of its defenses meant that the 
Philippines were a prime target for invasion. While the Navy advocated for a step-by-step plan, 
the more rapid strategies forwarded by the army called for immediate strikes on multiple regions 
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including Guam, Malaya, and the Philippines.77 Even the Navy’s more cautious plans called for 
simultaneous strikes, and this was ultimately how the attack was carried out in December 1941. 
The Philippines were geographically isolated, and simultaneous strikes were excellent for 
severing U.S. supply chains and taking advantage of the limited defenses available on the 
islands. One of the only critical factors that remained was an opportune moment to attack, and 
the lackluster Philippine defenses meant that the U.S. Navy was the primary concern. The Navy 
was the primary avenue for reinforcements and support available to the Philippines, and needed 
to be taken out to limit the U.S.’ defensive efforts as much as possible.  
 
The Invasion and Fall of the Philippines 
Despite the numerous defensive and political shortcomings of the Philippines in 1941, the 
efficiency with which Japan was able to seize the islands and decisively cut off any hope of 
reinforcement was beyond the United States’ worst fears. Japan’s well-equipped amphibious 
infantry and air assets quickly annihilated the meager air force afforded to the Philippines in 
mere days and coordinated perfectly with the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941. The 
invasion of the Philippines was nearly a worst-case scenario, and every tactical flaw inherent in 
the use of Bataan as a defensive point for reinforcement was exploited and maximized by a series 
of highly coordinated strikes. While there had been some debate surrounding Japanese strategy 
and the scope of their targets, the sheer number of targets attacked “almost simultaneously” by 
Japanese forces extended far beyond Pearl Harbor, surpassing the expectations of many U.S. 
planners who did not believe that the Japanese could strike multiple substantial targets at once.78 
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These simultaneous attacks accomplished the dual goals of taking U.S. forces by surprise and 
completely seizing the initiative in the Pacific, and the larger scope meant that the conquest of 
the Philippines would be unhindered by additional reinforcements or supplies. 
 Japan eliminated most of the U.S. army’s air power within a matter of hours by 
conducting low-flying strafing runs, and the most critical airfields on Luzon such as Clark Field 
were crippled in less than 24 hours.79 In addition to the inability of naval forces to respond after 
the strike on Pearl Harbor, forces in the Philippines now lacked air support, and Japan’s world-
class planes were able to attack without fear of interception. However, this did not mean that 
they had free reign, and by Doyle Decker’s account (who was in the 200th coastal artillery, anti-
aircraft section at the time) anti-air batteries enjoyed more success than the available air corps. 
He recalled, “I was in the anti-aircraft section. We were having pretty good luck knocking the 
Jap planes down and we were several miles behind the lines… but when they began to cut 
rations we began to feel we were not going to get any help soon. Then when the army ordered 
MacArthur out, I think we all realized it was hopeless.”80 
 The destruction of much of the U.S. naval forces at Pearl Harbor was one of the most 
decisive components of the Japanese victory, and it completely crippled existing strategies. The 
pre-war defensive strategy in the Philippines was designed to allow U.S. soldiers and the 
Philippine army to fall back to Bataan on the island of Luzon and entrench themselves in order to 
allow time for reinforcements to arrive. While supplies could be rationed and temporary defenses 
could be created, the primary means of reinforcement and resupply was eliminated when Japan 
destroyed a critical number of U.S. ships at Pearl Harbor. This inability to receive support was 
nearly incomprehensible to soldiers like Mailheau, who stated that “when the Japs first attacked 
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that first day over there, my god, we knew we were vulnerable as hell… But that was the 
damnest [sic] thing. We never once figured that the Americans would not be able to make their 
way over for support… we even felt that way on Bataan, right up to, practically, the day of the 
surrender.”81 The U.S. and Filipino soldiers were cut off, and the Japanese were now able to 
conduct naval landings with limited reprisal.  
 The Japanese conducted several landings (six in total, of which all but two were centered 
on the island of Luzon), and did so on December 8th, only one day after initial contact with U.S. 
forces at Pearl Harbor.82 None of the landings experienced substantial enough resistance to 
prevent the Japanese Navy from fulfilling its objectives, and the Japanese had established a solid 
hold on Luzon by the 17th, taking only 10 days to accomplish all of its preparations (cutting off 
reinforcements, supply lines, and taking territory critical to U.S. defensive efforts).83 While 
Japan had expected an even more rapid victory, their ability to cut off aid from the Philippines 
still proved critical in their military success, and was one of the key reasons that they were able 
to conquer most of the Philippines by May 1942.84 Official strategy still dictated that U.S. 
soldiers were to move back to Bataan, and preparations for a fall back to Bataan began as early 
as December 23rd.85 By March 12th, the situation had worsened enough to prompt General 
MacArthur’s withdrawal, which dealt a significant blow to morale.86 Resistance continued for 
several months, but as the siege of Bataan progressed Japan’s severance of critical U.S. supply 
lines caused resources to run low, and food soon became a primary concern among the defenders 
of Bataan.   
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By early April, all hope of holding out had run out, and negotiations for an official 
surrender began. The reinforcements and supplies that had been cut off continued to critically 
hamper any attempts to mount substantial counter-attacks, and even defense was now unfeasible 
due to the food shortages that now plagued the defense of Bataan.87 Military pressure from 
Japanese forces was constant, and the continued attack wore down the various battalions left for 
the defense of the city, and, -contrary to the orders that General King had been given, he chose 
surrender rather than to fight to the last man, the latter of which both MacArthur and Roosevelt 
had ordered.88 Once the surrender order was issued to U.S. soldiers, many instead chose to 
retreat into the jungle in order to avoid capture.89 Decker wrote, “At this time several of us began 
plans to escape to the mountains. When the surrender came, we all realized it would only be a 
matter of time before the Japs were on us.”90 The combination of inadequate defenses, Japanese 
expansion, economic maneuvering by the U.S., and the complete severance of critical support 
structures hastened Japan’s conquest of the Philippines, which was complete in less than four 
months. The U.S. and Philippine army were both soundly defeated in short order, and those who 
had withdrawn to Bataan were now either captured or wandering in the surrounding jungles and 
mountainsides. Japan had invaded and conquered with a degree of military efficiency that 
impressed even optimistic officers at the time, and the flaws in existing U.S.-Pacific strategy 
proved to be the downfall of the United States’ entire defensive effort throughout not only the 
Philippines, but the entire Pacific theater.91 
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 However, not all soldiers either American or Filipino had fallen back to Bataan, and 
while the islands had been largely conquered, remnants of the American army survived. While 
many had chosen to stand and fight on Luzon, local Philippine volunteers had the opportunity 
during the opening stages of the invasion to reintegrate into their former communities instead of 
surrendering alongside the Americans, which significantly complicated the distinction between 
soldier and civilian later on.92 Soldiers outside of the city like Doyle Decker made plans to 
escape into either the jungle or mountains (the mountains were more specific to Luzon), and 
throughout the next three years, the Philippines housed several independent pockets of resistance 
until official U.S. forces returned in 1944.93 Luzon was the dedicated location for the U.S. 
forces’ last stand, and it was now a survival zone for hundreds of displaced soldiers who were 
faced with occupation by a foreign power and limited supplies that could not be replenished. The 
time for direct conflict between the U.S. and Japan in the Philippines ended in April 1942, and 
did not resume until MacArthur’s return in 1944. Instead, the pace of conflict was dictated by 
irregular warfare for nearly three years, and the survivors of the invasion were forced to 
improvise. 
 
Japan’s Government: Rhetoric and Reality  
 The Japanese occupation of the Philippines was a tenuous balance of cooperation and 
retaliation, and while there were numerous shortcomings with Japan’s approach to governing the 
Philippines, they were presented with a politically delicate and tense situation. While they had 
conquered the Philippines with startling speed, Japan now had to balance the extraction of 
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resources and the elimination of guerrillas with fostering a cooperative territorial government, 
and it proved impossible to achieve both. The U.S.’s invasion of the Philippines in 1898 was a 
similarly bloody affair to the Japanese invasion, but the U.S. government had the advantage of 
time with which to promote its interests and culture in the region. Japan was placed on a much 
more limited and intense time-table due to its limited resources, which placed it in an even more 
uncomfortable position than the U.S. of 1898. While Japan’s occupation government attempted 
to create positive relationships with the Filipinos, it ultimately settled on a harsh strategy of 
retaliation against the guerrillas by punishing any individuals who aided or housed guerrillas 
throughout the islands, primarily in the forms of burning property, maintaining regular patrols, 
and killing suspected U.S. collaborators.94 Collaboration with the new government was heavily 
encouraged, and Japanese forces took available opportunities to infiltrate and subvert guerrilla 
movements from within by working with informants in order to disrupt or eliminate guerrilla 
cells.95 While this strategy was at times effective in turning public opinion against guerrillas, it 
also undermined valuable Japanese pretenses to peace and cooperation. It promoted more 
decisive commitments to either side, and the U.S. promise of independence complicated Japan’s 
pledges of freedom from Western empires, considering that the Philippines had already been 
legally promised such autonomy.  
 Initial impressions of the new Japanese occupation were unfavorable and marked by 
atrocity. Japan’s wartime reputation for brutality was first brought to the forefront in the 
Philippines during the forced march of U.S. and Filipino prisoners to Japanese internment camps 
in April 1942, which became infamously known as the Bataan Death March. During the march, 
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both U.S. and Filipino soldiers were treated with a degree of cruelty that is still discussed as one 
of the foremost examples of Japanese wartime atrocities alongside the massacre at Nanking, 
China in 1937. While disease was a common cause of death during the march, starvation and 
random killings by Japanese soldiers were also leading causes of the nearly 600-750 American 
and 5,000-10,000 Filipino deaths, and the seeming randomness of these murders was viewed 
with suspicion and bewilderment by both soldiers at the time and modern historical writers.96 
The brutality shown during the Death March compounded outrage at the U.S.’ surrender in April 
1942, since the surrender at Bataan had now additionally resulted in the suffering and deaths of 
thousands of Filipino soldiers in addition to U.S. forces. Approximately 65,000 of the 75,000 
prisoners were Philippine army instead of U.S. servicemen, inciting additional anger among 
Filipinos at both the U.S. for abandoning the islands and towards the Japanese for their blatant 
cruelty.97 While in reality surrender had been enacted in response to dwindling supplies and an 
inability to even feed the defenders of Bataan, the brutality that ensued meant that initially, the 
surrender was considered tantamount to abandonment by the U.S. government.   
 Nevertheless, the new territorial government knew that it had to act quickly in order to 
establish its legitimacy, and it soon declared the creation of an independent Philippine 
government in 1943. In theory, this was a beneficial political move that both undermined earlier 
U.S. promises and encouraged a better working relationship between Japan and the Philippines, 
maintaining the appearance of independence while in reality relegating the Philippines to a 
puppet government of the Japanese Empire. The many problems with this were in its execution, 
which mainly served to alienate potential collaborators and undermine the advantageous pretense 
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of independence. While the U.S. promise of independence had gone through a number of 
alterations and delays, MacArthur had nevertheless cultivated an impressive image for himself in 
the Philippines alongside President Quezon throughout his tenure, and time had rendered the 
U.S. administration both tired and the distribution of military forces sparse. Conversely, Japan 
was faced with a limited timeframe of both resources and available manpower, and while its 
initial strike had been devastating, fully seizing control of each island and eliminating all U.S. 
soldiers who had not surrendered were very difficult tasks.   
 The continued presence of remnants of the U.S. army, however, damaged Japan’s local 
relationships over time. While searching for U.S. soldiers, Japanese occupation forces burned 
camps and various villages, and smaller-scale atrocities increased in frequency as they attempted 
to flush out U.S. guerrillas.98 The Philippines had faced colonial occupations at least twice before 
the Japanese under the Spanish and Americans, and the continued presence of Japanese soldiers 
undercut the notion that the Philippines were finally freed from colonial influence. While the 
Tydings-McDuffie act would not completely free the Philippines from U.S. influence (especially 
American business interests), it was still the most direct promise of a legal escape from colonial 
rule that had been proposed since Spain claimed the islands in the sixteenth century. The 
Japanese implementation of colonially administered independence was severely flawed, but there 
were very few alternatives in retrospect. Had the Japanese government stated its intentions 
honestly, the offer would have seemed doubly unattractive. The granting of independence in 
name only eroded the messaging of the new government as the occupation progressed, and the 
presence of U.S. guerrillas meant that Japanese forces needed to balance their efforts at flushing 
out guerrillas with local cooperation.  
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 Though the adopted methods of retaliation and strict punishment came with significant 
disadvantages, the Japanese measures were effective in securing limited acceptance. Despite the 
inherent contradiction of an independent government within the economic sphere and oversight 
of a larger empire, the Japanese decision to grant independence found strong support among 
some pro-independence groups in the Philippines including the Patriotic League of Filipinos (or 
Makapili), most of whom rallied behind the Japanese promise of independence even near the 
war’s end in 1945 as American forces were retaking the Philippines.99 This loyalty even resulted 
in an open declaration of war by the Makapili against U.S. forces as they re-took the islands as 
late as 1945.100 Despite Japan’s difficult goal of establishing the second major reorganization of 
Philippine government in less than fifty years, they managed to secure support from certain 
elements that had been waiting for a chance to retaliate against the U.S., and worked with them 
in order to defend Japan’s new territory.  
 Despite the intensity of this support from groups like the Makapili, it was not enough to 
compensate for the damaging diplomatic effects of Japanese conduct throughout the majority of 
the occupation. An intensely loyal minority is not enough to secure victory in a protracted 
guerrilla conflict, which requires healthy relationships with the wider public in order to limit 
strategic opportunities for resistance forces. Specifically, the Makapili are only estimated to have 
numbered around 5,000 members, a tiny number in a region with a population of 16,000,303.101 
In addition, a significant amount of the zeal shown towards the Japanese promise of 
independence had existed long before the war, and Japan took advantage of pre-existing 
revolutionary ideals rather than instilling widespread Japanese nationalism, one of the necessary 
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components of establishing a greater Asian Co-Prosperity sphere.102 Even the legitimate 
developmental strides and working relationships that Japan made with local groups could not 
help them achieve widespread acceptance in the Philippines, and the Japanese administration’s 
inability to make good on their rhetoric and promises of true independence and Pan-Asian 
cooperation contributed to “rampant Anti-Japanese sentiments” in the Philippines by the end of 
the occupation.103 
 Despite these tactical and diplomatic shortcomings, however, the anti-guerrilla tactics 
adopted by the Japanese were at times effective in their intended functions, which were to punish 
guerrilla sympathizers and eliminate pockets of resistance. On Luzon, for example, the Japanese 
succeeded in hiring “civilian collaborators” in order to infiltrate guerrilla cells, providing 
information and intelligence that was crucial in countering guerrilla movements.104 In addition, 
the reprisal against civilians who aided Americans was not a strategy devoid of merit, since in 
some communities the harsh punishments created resentment towards guerrillas by association 
rather than the Japanese, which was what the tactic was designed to accomplish.105 By making 
resistance undesirable and cooperation beneficial, the occupation sought to balance its reputation 
with ample amounts of fear and admiration, and it was effective, albeit mostly in the short term.  
Ultimately, severe time constraints and a core inability to keep rhetoric and policy 
consistent damaged Japan’s effectiveness as the colonial administrator of the Philippines. While 
Japan’s counter-guerilla strategy adapted and made strides in cooperation with local populations, 
the decentralized nature of the guerrilla movements and collaboration between civilians and 
remnants of the U.S. military meant that the complete elimination of resistance by 1945 was 
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nearly impossible. With more time and ability to commit resources, the new administration may 
have been able to make good on its promises of cooperation and economic partnership, but the 
constant issues of dwindling military resources and an imperative to defeat the guerrillas led to 
drastic measures that undercut said pledges. The U.S. returned in late 1944, and in the end, three 
years proved to be far too short a timeframe for success. The wounds of invasion were still fresh, 
atrocities undermined attempts to create provisional relationships, and economic conditions 
proved too extreme to develop the cooperation necessary to create a new Philippine-Japanese 
union. While punishment served its intended function, it also came with costs, and guerrilla cells 
were ultimately able to capitalize on them by forming local relationships that the new occupation 
simply could not.  
 
Conclusion 
 The defense of the Philippines crumbled in less than five months, and the complete defeat 
of the U.S. army caused a scattering of U.S. soldiers who were not captured during the surrender 
of Bataan. These were the conditions in which Decker and Mailheau became guerrilla fighters. 
Mailheau had served in the defense of Bataan, and like many soldiers on Luzon, suffered greatly 
during the Bataan Death March. He was one of the few (estimated to be less than 400) to escape 
it, joining with other soldiers after coming extremely close to starvation and death.106 Decker had 
the benefit of fleeing into the surrounding jungle, but faced extraordinarily harsh survival 
conditions that nearly killed him during the critical initial weeks of the occupation. While large-
scale political and historical conflict between the U.S. and Japan had resulted in the U.S. army’s 
defeat in the Philippines, it was now individual soldiers like Decker and Mailheau who now had 
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to live with the consequences and salvage what they could from complete disaster. For nearly 
three years from 1942 to 1945, they survived in the jungle and resisted Japanese rule however 
they could. Without the help that they received from fellow soldiers, local tribesmen, and 
citizens throughout the occupation they would almost certainly have perished in the opening 
weeks.  
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BOB MAILHEAU: PERSEVERENCE AND COOPERATION IN RESISTANCE 
 
 Robert “Bob” Mailheau took a very active approach to guerrilla warfare, despite being 
prevented from doing so on multiple occasions by the Japanese occupation and Central Luzon’s 
environment. By March 1945, he had survived the Bataan Death March, a severe tonsil infection 
that left him nearly unable to function, and multiple skirmishes with Japanese soldiers. He could 
not have done so without the assistance of several civilians, former Philippine army soldiers, and 
Negrito tribesmen, but his survival was also due to his persistence and his willingness to take an 
active role in forming a larger resistance movement. Mailheau was instrumental in forming the 
155th guerrilla unit, and was able to create a lasting rallying point in Central Luzon alongside 
soldiers Clay Conner and Frank Gyovai. While other groups in the region fractured internally 
and constantly struggled over leadership, the tactics of the 155th that Mailheau helped create 
molded the group into a cooperative entity with the surrounding villages, and formed a mutual 
relationship with the civilians that had already saved his life multiple times by 1943. Mailheau 
joined the army out of the fear of involvement in a European conflict, but quickly adapted in 
order to resist the Japanese occupation by establishing relationships with both U.S. soldiers and 
local forces, which undoubtedly contributed to the 155th’s success and ensured Mailheau’s 
survival.  
 
Life Prior to the War and the Surrender on Bataan 
 Importantly, Bob Mailheau served in the Philippines as a matter of choice rather than 
circumstance. When he joined the U.S. army on August 10th, 1940, he was given the option to 
choose his posting, and selected the Philippines under the assumption that they would be far 
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from any potential military conflict in Europe.107 While he was somewhat aware of Japan’s 
reputation as a world power, most of his attention prior to 1941 was focused on Germany’s 
military buildup during the 1930s. Throughout his school life in Southern California, most 
discussions regarding another potential world war were the subject of humorous jabs between 
students. In one of Mailheau’s post-war accounts compiled by historian Dwayne Sanford during 
the 1980s, he stated that while some comments were made towards Japanese students regarding 
“which side” Japan would be on in a hypothetical future war, he dismissed it as schoolyard talk 
at the time rather than any attempts at insightful political commentary.108  
Throughout these 1980s interviews, Mailheau was adamant that the turning point for him 
and many of his friends was the arrival of several Jewish families who had immigrated to their 
neighborhood in California in 1940. 109 After discussing the political and military situation in 
Germany with the families in his neighborhood, Mailheau was convinced that a German-
American conflict was disturbingly possible. Mailheau volunteered alongside two of his high 
school friends for the army Air Corps in August 1940 and chose to go to the Philippines, citing 
that its remoteness and distance from Europe were the key reasons for his choice.110 Mailheau 
also viewed the Philippines as an opportunity for something of a vacation, directly summarizing 
his rationale as “What the heck, let’s do some travelling.”111 For Mailheau, talk of German 
expansion motivated him to seek a posting as far from his fears of conflict as possible, which 
meant that he chose the remote Philippines. While he succeeded in this regard, it also placed him 
much closer to Japan’s military sphere.  
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 Prior to the outbreak of the U.S.-Pacific War in December 1941, Mailheau’s rationale 
held true, and his experiences mostly consisted of guard duty with scattered rumors of activity 
among small radical political groups in the Philippines. There were minimal concerns regarding 
Japan, and Mailheau stated that “the atmosphere at that time was le se faire [sic]. There was 
nothing to be concerned about.”112 While there were worries about scattered resistance from 
domestic organizations like the Communist Hukbalahap group (referred to as “Huks” by 
Mailheau), most of it amounted to concentrated areas in the Philippines like the city of Angeles, 
where Mailheau was frequently called in for guard duty.113 Suspicions were mostly directed 
primarily towards civilians asking about sensitive military information, including the numbers of 
aircraft at varying airfields in passing conversation.114 While Mailheau spoke of multiple brawls 
between American soldiers and Filipino civilians in certain communities like Angeles, most of it 
resulted from conflicts between individuals or small groups in town rather than any orders to 
investigate radical or Communist political activity. Some political groups such as the Ganap (a 
group comprised of pro-Japanese Filipinos) made attempts to provoke action from the 
Hukbalahap group, but it did not prompt any serious discussion regarding Japan. At the time, 
Mailheau and the soldiers around him were aware that they needed to exercise caution when 
speaking in towns on guard duty as a general rule, but speculation of direct invasion was rare.115  
The previously relaxed atmosphere in the Philippines shifted to renewed concern for 
Mailheau when news of the Axis pact between Italy, Germany, and Japan in September 1940 
came, citing that initial worries of U.S. involvement in war began to spread around October 
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1941.116 Specifically, he later stated that as of October 1941, “It looked more and more like we 
were going to be involved in Europe. The Axis forces had announced their allegiance, so it kind 
of just added up—one plus one equals two.”117 The Axis Pact initiated Mailheau’s fears of war 
with Japan, who in the event of war with the U.S. would be brought into the conflict by proxy. 
By Mailheau’s accounts, the possibility of a conflict directly initiated by Japan had not crossed 
his mind. He even went so far as to state that “up to a couple of months before Pearl Harbor, we 
(he and his fellow soldiers) never gave the Jap threat a second thought.”118 While in hindsight 
this attitude seems strange, Japan had been an Allied country throughout World War I, and its 
reputation had not soured substantially enough to warrant concern from Mailheau or the soldiers 
around him. While Mailheau began to consider the likelihood of a Japanese military invasion 
over time, another conflict with Germany was still the most pressing issue in his mind, and 
despite Japan’s numerous invasions throughout the 1930s and the United States’ economic 
responses (such as the oil embargo), he and his fellow soldiers only seriously considered war 
with Japan as a primary enemy mere months before the invasion.  
Despite the extremely limited defenses in the pre-war Philippines described earlier, 
soldiers felt that they had little cause for widespread concern prior to the crippling of the U.S. 
Navy in December 1941. Despite the budgetary shortcomings faced by the U.S. defense in the 
Philippines, Mailheau was still somewhat confident in the army’s defensive capabilities prior to 
the invasion, with the notable exception of the outdated air complement. While the soldiers’ 
equipment was somewhat outdated, Mailheau and his fellow soldiers each had a respectable 
array of items, including “rifles… side arms, helmets, gas masks… a knapsack with a blanket, 
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and a few food items,” as well as water canteens.119 According to Mailheau, he did not appraise 
the situation as either overly hopeless or fortunate, but knew that their air force was a weak link 
in available defenses. Specifically, he stated that prior to the invasion “we didn’t feel that 
confident, but we didn’t feel that vulnerable either. But we knew our Air Force was a big 
joke.”120 Mailheau was particularly aware of the outdated aerial equipment due to his posting in 
the Tow Target Squadron at Clark Field, which towed aerial targets to various locations around 
the base for later use as training targets for anti-aircraft and planes.121 As mentioned previously, 
Mailheau was also under the impression that the U.S. Navy would be able to reinforce the 
Philippines, and the possibility that the United States’ naval capability could be wiped out was 
not widely considered.122 This confidence, however, was founded with very limited knowledge 
of Japan’s military efficiency, as well as its plans to cripple the Philippines’ means of 
reinforcement and supply.  
Mailheau saw the devastating effects of the invasion as early as the first day December 
8th, 1941, and his stationing at Clark Field (a major U.S. airstrip) meant that he witnessed Japan’s 
air assault firsthand.123 Mailheau recalled that, “When the war started, the Japs pretty well wiped 
us out at Clark Field. What few planes that were flyable… flew down to the southern islands, 
and we didn’t have many fighters to speak of. None of the squadron survived.”124 With the 
destruction of the planes at Clark Field, many of the personnel dedicated to flight training such 
as Mailheau were moved west in order to secure underbrush cover from enemy planes until they 
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could be moved to Bataan. Soldiers were soon ordered to carry weapons at all times and to 
prepare to fall back to Bataan in the case of retreat, which had already been discussed as basic 
protocol in the event of invasion.125 Fortunately, Mailheau was able to more easily transition into 
an infantry role due to universal infantry training at the time of his enlistment, and he was soon 
incorporated into the 24th pursuit group, where his role was primarily to engage in anti-sniper 
patrols.126 Throughout the following months, Mailheau was involved in defensive efforts to drive 
back Japanese landings around Bataan and fend off attacks from Bataan’s rear, but he ultimately 
received the surrender order in April 1942.  
When Mailheau was given the surrender order, he and a number of fellow soldiers 
immediately decided against it.127 Mailheau’s decision was not based on pre-existing information 
about Japan’s wartime treatment of prisoners, but rather on considering the surrender foolish.128 
Mailheau’s initial plan was to rendezvous with like-minded soldiers on the slopes of Mount 
Bataan, and he stashed weapons and ammunition in order to prepare.129 However, his attempts 
were rendered completely unsuccessful when he was intercepted by a large group of Japanese 
soldiers on his journey to the rendezvous point.130 While he considered either fighting or 
escaping, in the moment he decided to surrender in order to survive, and threw up his hands. 
Though he had been openly dismissive of any form of organized surrender, he chose it when 
confronted with the immediate threat of violence. While Mailheau recalled that the Japanese 
soldiers “bullied him a little bit,” they otherwise captured him without incident, and moved him 
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to a nearby base camp where he was kept for four days before being placed in the infamous 
Bataan Death March.131 
 
Death March and Escape 
 Mailheau’s worst fears of capture were exceeded by the hostility that he faced 
throughout the following weeks, and while accounts of the Bataan Death March’s brutality are 
widely available, Mailheau’s descriptions are nevertheless unnervingly specific. The primary 
trait of the march that Mailheau emphasized in later interviews was the needlessness and 
frequency of the brutality demonstrated towards American soldiers, recalling that, “…slaughter 
and brutality was a continuous thing, believe me. It didn’t happen once every three days… It 
happened in my case damned near every fifteen, or twenty minutes.”132 The brutality that 
Mailheau witnessed was frequent, and Mailheau expressed difficulty in adequately conveying the 
daily experience of the march. When describing it, Mailheau stated that “What I say here, you 
might have heard several times. I know, most of you have seen captured war films of the Bataan 
Death March. And all of those programs that they show you on television are limited to half-an-
hour, or an hour, and they jump from here to there, to somewhere else. And you don’t really get 
to see the full impact of what went on.”133 While his early impressions during the Death March 
convinced Mailheau that the experience was going to be unpleasant, its constant tortures 
motivated Mailheau’s escape attempt on the tenth day of the March by wearing down his 
willingness to cooperate over time. It convinced him of the importance of both resisting the 
occupation and working with civilians in order to do so, and inspired many of his later strategies. 
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The Bataan Death March is already one of the more extensively analyzed atrocities of the 
U.S. Pacific War, but its importance in shaping perceptions of Japan’s wartime character cannot 
be understated. Shortly summarized, it was the forced march of Filipino and American POWs to 
internment camps by Japanese forces in the aftermath of the surrender at Bataan on April 9th. The 
Bataan Death March (referred to simply as the “Death March” by Mailheau) has become 
infamous for the several hundreds of Filipino and U.S. casualties inflicted by Japanese soldiers 
along the march’s path, and has become emblematic of Japan’s capacity for wartime brutality 
during WWII.134 The Death March only lasted approximately 5 days, but resulted in the loss of 
hundreds of U.S. soldiers and thousands of Filipino soldiers.135 While the 1930s and 40s 
witnessed similar massacres and displays of random violence carried out by many militaries, the 
Death March stands as one of the most brutal atrocities inflicted on U.S. throughout WWII, and 
is one of the most direct examples of Japan inflicting the same colonial violence upon its 
conquered populations as the empires it was attempting to supplant.136 In addition, Filipino 
casualties were much greater than American losses, which did not help to support Japan’s claims 
of liberation.137 Japan attempted to paint itself as a savior of Asia through its anti-Western 
rhetoric and retaliation against Western colonial power, but repeated several mistakes perpetrated 
by the empires that it was attempting to replace.  
While determining the causes of such frequent atrocity is complicated given the 
individual and state-level factors of Imperial Japan, Mailheau surmised that many of the displays 
of cruelty that he witnessed were perpetrated in order to dissuade the public from aiding the 
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surrendered U.S. and Filipino soldiers.138 While Japan’s adherence global conventions of warfare 
throughout WWII was complicated by anti-Western sentiments and conflicts between individual 
Japanese officers and the government, this made little difference to Mailheau at the time, who 
was instead concerned by the numerous shows of violence that he witnessed and experienced 
along the Death March’s path.139 On one occasion, Mailheau recalled Japanese military trucks 
deliberately attempting to knock marching U.S. soldiers off of the side of the road, as well as 
other executions of POWs.140 In another case, he described Japanese soldiers slicing U.S. 
soldiers with a bayonet on the side of the road as both a method of direct punishment for 
disobedience and as a public deterrent to empathetic civilians.141 While Filipino civilians 
continued to provide food to the soldiers in spite of this, these showings still shocked Mailheau 
and other marching U.S. soldiers, who were unprepared for the extent of violence that they 
witnessed and suffered. While secondary works have chronicled the brutality of WWII-era Japan 
for decades since, at the time Mailheau and the soldiers around him had only previously regarded 
Japan with mild apathy, which meant that their reactions to these atrocities were particularly 
intense. 
 Mailheau and his fellow soldiers also had to contend with limited resources, especially as 
it soon became clear that their captors would provide little. Food and water were both 
particularly scarce during the Death March, and Mailheau had to rely on his pre-existing stores 
of food and canteen water for fourteen days. Judging by Mailheau’s remarks, he and several 
other soldiers were initially uncertain about whether or not they would be provided with food, 
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but were soon aware that this would not generally be the case.142 Fortunately for Mailheau, he 
had been able to prepare food and fill his canteen with enough water for at least a few days, and 
was able to ration its contents effectively enough to use it for around four days. Aside from these 
small stocks, they were dependent on their guards and friendly civilians for any resupply, and the 
resources that they were able to procure from Japanese soldiers was inconsistent at best.143  
Once again, support from civilians was shown very early on following the surrender, and 
the contributions that they made saved the lives of Mailheau and other prisoners. Food was 
tossed to soldiers by onlookers whenever possible, and these provisions were some of the only 
food that Mailheau and his fellow soldiers received throughout the march.144 Mailheau stated that 
even while Japanese soldiers continued to execute U.S. POWs as a deterrent, “the Filipinos 
continued to line up on the sides of the road and toss whatever they could give.”145 While aid 
from Japanese cooks or even occasionally soldiers did occur, it was also much more inconsistent 
than help from civilians during the march, and considering the lack of any food or water given to 
Mailheau during the fourteen days of capture and ten days of physical marching (outside of 
canteen refills occasionally allowed by Japanese guards), it could well have been the difference 
between life and death for soldiers forced to participate in the march.146 Mailheau directly 
attested to this, and stated decades later in an interview that “I tell you… if it wasn’t for the 
Filipinos… If it hadn’t been for them, myself (and many others) would (not) be around today. 
And we’re so greatful [sic]. And you know, they didn’t have to do that. If humanity could take a 
lesson from the Filipinos… I’m sure the world would benefit.”147 The nearly thankless aid that 
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civilians provided left such an impression on Mailheau that he continued to praise their efforts 
throughout his interviews in 1984, and his gratitude could not have been more direct. It was not 
the last time that Mailheau depended on support from Filipino civilians to survive, but their 
willingness to aid U.S. soldiers despite direct deterrents and personal risk left a lasting 
impression on Mailheau, and his gratitude was repeated throughout his later recollections.   
To his surprise, Mailheau managed to procure food from individual Japanese cooks and 
soldiers during the Death March, and mentioned that his guards were more likely to share rice 
following large meals with excess amounts of food.148 In one case, a Japanese cook not only 
provided Mailheau with food, but also multiple U.S. soldiers after Mailheau indicated that they 
were also in need.149 Despite the tremendous cruelty that characterized most of his experience in 
the Death March, Mailheau still received support from Japanese personnel, albeit in limited 
amounts. Considering that punishment would have been swift for these Japanese soldiers for 
providing any aid, it is surprising that they were willing to do so at all with the possibility of 
execution by their commanders, and while the Death March has justifiably earned a negative 
reputation, there was a natural variance in the soldiers’ capacity for cruelty.150 Brutality was not 
universal among the Japanese soldiers, and Mailheau’s accounts of their genuine contributions at 
significant personal risk dispel many of the narratives of inherent Japanese cruelty despite the 
otherwise horrid conditions of the Bataan Death March. Whether or not it compensates for the 
widespread killing of POWs is up for debate, but considering Mailheau’s understandable 
vehemence towards the Death March, it is surprising that he made note of the help he received 
from Japanese soldiers decades later in 1984. However, it was not enough to convince Mailheau 
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that he could survive the Death March, and by the tenth day, Mailheau had resolved to either 
escape or perish.  
  When he finally got his chance, Mailheau successfully escaped from the Bataan Death 
March, which was rare but not unprecedented. Reliable estimates for the number of successful 
escapees are difficult to come by, but the combined number of American soldiers to escape or 
avoid the Death March was no greater than 400, a paltry number compared to the more than 
10,000 U.S. soldiers who were placed on the march (especially since the figure of 400 includes 
those who avoided the Death March entirely).151 While Mailheau described his guards as 
constantly observant, he also noticed a potential opportunity for escape between various points 
on the road, especially after patrols began to loosen. His guess for the cause of the lessened 
security was that “By then [ten days into the journey] we had lost so many of the fellows that I 
guess the Japs figured that none of us had the energy to make an escape.”152 Noticing this lull in 
concentration, Mailheau determined that he would be able to successfully escape by slithering 
off through the various brush areas and thickets along the way, and move into the rice paddies.153 
Fortunately, he was also somewhat familiar with the surrounding geography due to his stationing 
at Clark Field prior to the invasion. 
He encouraged others to take advantage of similar opportunities along the march’s path, 
but to do so one at a time so as to not draw attention or reveal that escapes were being 
planned.154 Mailheau recalled that the other soldiers who he discussed his plans with told him not 
to attempt escape, still believing that the Geneva Convention would be honored. What they 
witnessed in comparison to Mailheau is unknown, but these statements still stand out as fairly 
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odd considering the notorious conditions of the Death March, as well as the nearly universally 
negative reputation that it has garnered. Nevertheless, Mailheau’s escape plans were not leaked 
to the Japanese guards, and Mailheau soon made good on his promise to attempt escape. He 
managed to “crawl from the side of the road, at one of the infrequent rest stops to the rice 
paddies...”155 and successfully escaped, marching for an undetermined distance before collapsing 
from exhaustion and being discovered by a group of Filipinos. Help could not have come at a 
more opportune time, and throughout the following weeks, Mailheau was again saved by 
Filipino civilians. He was in desperately poor physical condition when he was found, and by his 
own recollection, he weighed “a hefty 72 pounds” compared to his usual 190 following his 
escape from the Death March.156 After two weeks of infrequent food and water, Mailheau was 
overjoyed to discover that the Filipinos who took him in were willing to share food with him, 
and even when it soon became clear that Mailheau’s physical condition was not meaningfully 
improving, they also sent him to a Catholic convent in order to recover. He recalled, 
 
They had food with them. They had a watermelon—a basketball watermelon. God, that 
tasted good!.. Then they took me several hundred yards beyond that, into a little grass 
shack… It was a good place for me to hide for about ten days, or so. I really wasn’t 
getting any better physically, and there wasn’t a heck of a lot they could do for me, so 
they arranged for me to go to the Catholic convent in Santa Rita. And the nuns literally 
nursed me back to a start to being healthy again.157 
 
Had Mailheau been treated with any less care or encountered an enemy patrol, he would 
have certainly died in the rice paddy where he was found. He was severely weakened both 
physically and psychologically (even admitting that when he was found, he no longer cared 
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whether they were friendly or hostile out of sheer exhaustion), and the lengths that his caretakers 
went to in order to facilitate his recovery were extraordinary.158 He was able to stay in the 
convent from May until September, and throughout his stay “met many people, learned their 
feelings, strengths, weaknesses, economics & [sic] politics.”159 He also became convinced that 
the continued presence of U.S. guerrillas was having a tangible effect on local morale, and 
believed that the relationship between civilians and U.S. guerrillas was crucial for each group’s 
long-term survival. He stated that  
 
We [U.S. guerrillas] had to be on our toes. Actually our lives were in the hands of all the 
natives we came in contact with. The one thing that made us comfortable with the 
populace was the fact that we [Americans in general] were very well like(d) [sic] before 
the war and ugly incidences [sic] involving the GI were at a minimum. Another was the 
fact that the Japs invaded, killed, raped, stole and ravaged at every turn. He treated the 
Filipino as a conquered animal and never made an attempt to show friendship or 
concern.160 
 
Despite Japan’s political attempts to incorporate the Philippines, Mailheau personally 
observed cruelty severe enough to convince him that Filipino and Negrito support was a direct 
response to it. Many of the instances described by Mailheau and Doyle Decker show that support 
from Filipino populations came too early to be solely motivated by Japanese wartime cruelty, 
and said support persisted beyond the opening weeks of the occupation. The presence of the 
American guerrillas provided native populations with a new option through which they could 
directly disrupt Japanese rule, as well as provide information in a manner that would not leave 
them as vulnerable to direct reprisal as open conflict. However, Mailheau could not operate on 
his own for long, and needed to find other guerrillas as soon as possible.  
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Guerrilla Warfare after Escape: Resistance in Transition 
 While he had escaped the Bataan Death March, Mailheau was now concerned with 
finding other guerrillas to cooperate with, and while he managed to do so fairly quickly, he was 
nearly killed by a U.S. soldier in the process. After drifting between various barrios (small 
villages in the Philippines that surrounded major cities such as Angeles), he was able to meet 
with fellow guerrilla and friend Joe Donahey, who was staying nearby.161 They managed to 
secure shelter in a shack in a nearby village, but Mailheau was nearly killed one night during an 
unexpected meeting with soldiers Clay Conner and Edwin Ramsey. While Mailheau and 
Donahey had been expecting company that night, they had not planned on meeting Conner or 
Ramsey at the time, who unexpectedly arrived the same night. While Mailheau was not hostile 
towards them (only stepping out to check if they were the company that he and Donahey were 
expecting), Ramsey surprised Mailheau by directly aiming a .45 caliber Colt pistol at him and 
demanding to know who he was.162 While Mailheau managed to convince him that he was not an 
enemy spy, he was certain that Ramsey fully intended to kill him if he could not be persuaded, 
and this incident was the most direct threat that Mailheau encountered from another soldier. 
Tensions were extremely high regarding guerrilla information, and fears of betrayal or 
infiltration by Japanese collaborators nearly resulted in Mailheau’s death.  
 Thankfully, Mailheau did not encounter any soldiers as directly hostile as Ramsey 
throughout the rest of his experience in the Philippines, and only knew Ramsey for a few days 
before joining with Conner and Donahey prior to the formation of the 155th guerrilla unit. 
Shortly after meeting Ramsey, his group numbered four (Donahey, Mailheau, Ramsey and 
Conner), and all but Donahey sought to create a larger guerrilla unit. Donahey’s reticence was 
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not without merit, considering that even groups of four Americans could easily attract unwanted 
attention or be described to Japanese anti-guerrilla forces. Over the next few weeks, their small 
group traveled throughout nearby foothills and made plans to head north and link up with Russell 
Volckmann’s guerrilla unit in Northern Luzon, which had made significant strides in organizing 
guerrilla resistance throughout the region.163 However, Donahey preferred to remain hidden in 
the jungles of Banaba, and debates over joining with larger guerrilla units delayed their ability to 
link with Volckmann, and ultimately rendered their efforts unsuccessful.164 Mailheau recalled 
was that they “had heard information—not a lot of information--- of Volckmann’s and 
Blackburn’s activities, and it just seemed like that was the logical place for soldiers to get to, and 
try to survive.”165 Ramsey, by contrast, had given Mailheau the impression that he wanted to be a 
part of a larger official military organization again, and that guerrilla warfare did not appeal to 
him. Whether this was what caused Ramsey to split from the unit is unknown, but even in a 
group only comprised of four members, it was difficult to decide on a course of action, let alone 
agree on the reasons for doing so.  
 Unfortunately, despite only receiving limited information regarding Blackburn and 
Volckmann’s guerrilla activities, Japanese forces cut off central Luzon from the north, and 
succeeded in preventing any of the group from rendezvousing with northern guerrillas.166 
Throughout the following months, Mailheau and Conner drifted between multiple groups and 
took multiple precautions in order to guard against discovery by Japanese patrols, especially as 
rumors of any groups of American soldiers tended to spread quickly. In Donahey’s absence, 
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Mailheau and Conner met up with a soldier named Frank Gyovai, who also later joined the 155 th. 
However, despite their best attempts to split their ranks, Japanese soldiers still followed up on 
rumors of five American soldiers in their area (since they had joined up with two other soldiers 
in the meantime), and Mailheau’s group was forced to escape and backtrack into familiar 
territory.167 Any attempts to form or maintain a larger group were constantly hindered, and the 
heavy Japanese activity both to the North and South prevented Mailheau’s differing guerrilla 
groups from making much progress. Japanese anti-guerrilla efforts were much more prevalent in 
Central Luzon than the North, and were able to prevent the various regional guerrilla units from 
combining or organizing effectively.168 Until the formation of the 155th (which still employed 
smaller subgroups in order to prevent discovery), Mailheau was unable to find or remain with a 
stable guerrilla unit, and Japanese efforts to contain guerrilla movement, seek out organized 
activity, and punish supporters all effectively prevented him from joining a larger unit for 
months.  
 
Creation and Operation of the 155th Guerrilla Unit 
 By April 1943, Mailheau and Conner joined with guerrilla Frank Gyovai around the 
Banaba area of Central Luzon, which was roughly nine miles southwest of Clark Field.169 
Around this time, they began to make plans to form a guerrilla unit themselves rather than 
joining a pre-existing force, likely due to their unsuccessful efforts to travel north of Central 
Luzon. Mailheau, Conner, and Gyovai decided to create the 155th guerrilla unit, which they 
named after the 155 mm. “Long Tom” artillery pieces used by the U.S. army.170 Soon after their 
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decision to form the 155th, they came into contact with Bob Campbell and Doyle Decker, the 
latter of which soon joined with Mailheau and began intelligence operations.171 The group 
ultimately consisted of six core members, which included Clay Conner, Bob Mailheau, Frank 
Gyovai, Joe Donahey, Doyle Decker, and Bob Campbell. Mailheau and Decker began to 
organize a defense network throughout the barrios that surrounded the Banaba lowlands (see 
Figure 3, “Map of the Bataan Peninsula, including Central Luzon” for Banaba’s location relative 
to Fassoth’s Camp), through which they could receive information concerning Japanese 
garrisons and cooperate with civilians.172 By creating a cooperative network, the 155th could 
expand without attracting additional attention, and its members were already well aware of the 
dangers of organizing too many American soldiers in one location. While Mailheau, Conner, and 
Gyovai’s experiences constantly prevented them from linking up with other guerrillas, the 
lessons that they learned in the process ultimately allowed the 155th to endure for the remainder 
of the war.  
Over time, Mailheau and Decker worked with each other more than any of the other 
members, and Decker shifted from survival with Campbell to active organization alongside 
Mailheau. Throughout the initial months of the group’s formation, Mailheau and Decker “were 
pretty involved in organizing. This meant many trips to lowland villages gaining the cooperation 
of the elders & [sic] youngsters alike, primarily to help us establish a barrio defense system, 
through which we could keep tabs on Jap patrols, movements, etc.”173 Mailheau and Decker 
concentrated on barrio recruitment and building support networks while Conner and Gyovai 
focused on organizing Negrito resistance, though neither task was exclusive to either pair. 
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174 
Figure 3. Map of the Bataan Peninsula, including Banaba in relation to Fassoth’s Camp and 
Olongapo. 
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While Donahey and Campbell “weren’t keen on becoming active members in the 
Guerrilla movement” and were left to work on their own initiative, the splitting of priorities 
between the two pairs (Decker and Mailheau along with Conner and Gyovai) allowed the unit to 
cover more ground and also reduce the risk of the unit’s elimination by dividing its 
components.175 By maintaining two dedicated pairs and targeting different elements of the 
Philippines’ population, the 155th was able to form a substantial network in surrounding villages 
that ultimately expanded the group’s range far beyond the six Americans who directly formed it. 
Without the relationships that the 155th created with Negrito and Filipino populations, it would 
not have been as successful in persisting and gathering intelligence.  
The group’s focus on garnering support from Filipino and Negrito populations led to a 
number of advantages during its operation, and allowed the 155th unit was able to expand its 
capabilities far beyond its core membership. The group regularly travelled alongside Filipino and 
Negrito allies, many of whom were often armed. While some more modern schemes of guerrilla 
warfare list the concealment of weapons as a common trait, neither the American members of the 
155th or their allies adopted this tactic.176 Mailheau recalled that the group “carried side arms all 
the time. And there were rifles available to us whenever we wanted them. And there was 
ammunition in and around. I think that Frank (Gyovai) eventually assembled quite a supply. 
Now, we didn’t go heavily armed all the time. Most of the time we did have either Humbo, or 
Mario, or some other Negritos with us, with their bows and arrows… Some of them had rifles. 
So we were sufficiently protected…”177 The 155th’s allies aided it militarily, medically, and 
especially geographically, as indigenous populations were able to provide valuable advice and 
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techniques that gave guerrillas an advantage over Japanese soldiers, who only occupied the 
islands for a couple of years. As mentioned previously in Decker’s experience, Negritos 
provided medical aid to the guerrillas on multiple occasions, and the unit’s ability to mobilize 
both groups’ efforts towards a common cause provided a wide berth of dependable backup for 
the 155th.  
 Mailheau was one of the more sociable members of the group, and despite rare 
personality conflicts at the time, believed that the unit’s members coexisted fairly well 
(especially in light of his more extreme experience with Lieutenant Ramsey). Most of the social 
discord within the 155th resulted from tensions brought about by harsh survival conditions, as 
well as the adverse effects of living in a tropical climate for an extended period. One of the only 
conflicts that Mailheau could recall was an incident with Frank Gyovai that nearly came to 
blows, later remarking that,  
 
The only tiff I remember, and I remember this clearly, was in our so called No.2 
headquarters, according to Frank’s maps… we had a little tiff. Rainy Season… more 
Japs, and since we didn’t know from one day to the next what the hell would happen… 
we almost came to blows, but Donahey and Conner calmed us down. From that point on, 
I never felt that Frank and I had any differences… My God, after all we’d gone through, I 
never felt closer to them [Mailheau referencing all of his fellow guerrillas including 
Gyovai].178 
 
While Conner referenced the conflict between the two in one of his writings, Mailheau 
never considered it at the time, and Gyovai wrote to him years after the war in order to re-
establish their friendship and deny any ill will towards Mailheau.179 Aside from this incident, the 
group operated rather smoothly, likely aided by the decision to split the unit into various pairs. 
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While the members of the 155th came from a number of different states and religious 
backgrounds, they were able to cooperate for the remainder of the war, which was not a given in 
guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon.180 
 The 155th unit was not a monolithic entity nor an organization with a completely focused 
mission, but it was a stable and limited collection of guerrillas who survived by adapting to the 
capabilities of their enemy and splitting tactical responsibilities. It faced significant limitations 
regarding manpower, but was ultimately able to persist far longer than a more traditionally 
powerful unit would have because of its more measured approach to resistance. The varying 
willingness of its members to engage in direct resistance also altered the group’s approach, and 
rather than focusing on additional weaponry or increasing its number of U.S. soldiers, it was able 
to cooperate with both estranged ex-Philippine army soldiers and civilians in order to subvert the 
Japanese government’s efforts to root out guerrilla resistance.181 The delegation of various tasks 
to different pairs limited the amount of American personnel in any given location at once, and 
the enlistment of civilians made information-gathering much more efficient and able to serve the 
disparate groups all involved in the 155th’s operations. It was the definitive proving ground for 
Mailheau’s belief that mutual resistance was essential, and the 155th was accordingly able to 
spread far beyond its initial scope and become a hub of resistance for both Negrito and Filipino 
forces as well as recruit formerly hesitant soldiers like Doyle Decker, Bob Campbell, and Joe 
Donahey. Its operations were not without significant difficulty, however, and the environment 
continued to pose major difficulties throughout the group’s period of operation, primarily in the 
form of tropical rain, winds, and debilitating infections. 
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Disease, Stress, and Hostile Environment 
 While the 155th’s surrounding support networks allowed the group to maintain a supply 
of medicine, the tropical environment still inflicted adverse and crippling effects on Mailheau 
and his men. Following the creation of the Barrio defense network in January 1944, Mailheau 
contracted a severe tonsil infection and dysentery, the former of which incapacitated him for 
weeks. He was unable to carry out any intelligence work, and faced significant difficulty in 
maintaining his own physical health after the tonsil infection prevented him from swallowing 
any food. His only source of nutrition was a liquid banana mixture made by Decker and Gyovai, 
and by the end of the process Mailheau weighed around 125 pounds compared to his usual 
weight of 190.182 Decker attempted to administer medical treatment to the best of his ability and 
wrote, “His tonsils are the worst I have ever seen. Each looks like a glob of yellow puss. I am 
trying to doctor him the best I can. I have been swabbing his throat with three drops of iodine in 
a spoonful of water.”183 According to Mailheau, Decker acquired the iodine after traveling into 
the lowlands, and decided to utilize it based on a “grandma’s tale” that it would work as a last-
ditch cure.184 Unbeknownst to Decker, he was using a rather extreme amount of iodine given the 
situation, and Mailheau coughed up his own tonsils after it was administered.185  
Needless to say, Mailheau was completely incapacitated by the process, and every day 
that passed that he was ill, the sub-headquarters of the 155th were critically compromised. In 
addition, Decker also contracted dysentery around the same time, and while it did not affect him 
as severely as Mailheau’s ailments, it halted most of the progress of Decker and Mailheau’s 
component of the unit and forced them to depend on the support networks that they had created 
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for protection. Once again, the group’s remoteness and relationships throughout the surrounding 
area paid off, and Decker and Mailheau were not attacked or discovered by any patrols during 
the process. However, Mailheau had gone through another period of severe physical degradation 
(the first being his time in the Bataan Death March), and the experience’s effects on his morale 
and autonomy were dire. When recounting the experience, Mailheau stated, “God, I was down… 
Decker had practically saved my life on that,” and stressed multiple times that he completely 
attributed his survival to Decker’s improvised treatment.186  
 The emotional effects of guerrilla warfare in Central Luzon were similarly severe. While 
Mailheau’s depression from his tonsil infection affected his ability to physically function, fellow 
guerrilla Frank Gyovai nearly perished as a result of the psychological effects of long-term 
survival and isolation. Whereas Mailheau was so severely impeded by his ailments that he could 
do little to directly put himself at risk, Gyovai came close to death on at least two occasions as a 
result of his mental stress, and while the exact causes of his behavior are unknown, two incidents 
described by Mailheau and Decker reveal that Gyovai’s judgement was severely impaired by his 
mental state. Following his personal conflict with Mailheau brought on by poor morale and 
weather, Gyovai was reported by Conner to have contemplated suicide by jumping from a 
nearby waterfall.187 Gyovai ultimately decided against it or was convinced not to by another, and 
Mailheau ultimately attributed the incident to the stress of the situation as well as the possibility 
that U.S. reinforcements would never come.188 The second incident however posed a much more 
direct threat to Gyovai’s physical health, when he suddenly began to adopt the limited dress of a 
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Negrito tribesmen and move in the open even during dangerous weather. Decker directly 
witnessed Frank’s strange behavior and wrote, 
 
Frank [Gyovai] seems to think that he is invincible. He has donned a G-string like a 
Negrito and goes in all kinds of weather. He will have to pay. Even the Negritos won’t 
get out in the rain… Today we received word that Frank is sick. He must have 
pneumonia—no medicine. He will be lucky if he survives. Today the natives gather at 
Conner’s shack. They have come to practice their native medicine on Frank. I have seen 
this before used on a Negrito. He survived and I hope Frank is as lucky.189 
 
While Gyovai survived the described treatment, the recklessness that he displayed by 
openly traveling during the rainy season with practically non-existent clothing was abnormal, 
especially considering the unit’s prior experiences with extreme weather. Adapting to the rainy 
seasons in the Philippines was already a constant challenge, and both Decker and Mailheau were 
forced to seek shelter on multiple occasions in order to avoid it.190 Decker also mentioned the 
Negritos’ avoidance of rainy weather, indicating that Frank’s behavior would have posed a 
significant danger even for natives of the jungle climate. Alongside Frank’s contemplation of 
suicide, it is one of the most extreme behavioral responses that either Decker or Mailheau 
personally described, and proof that their isolation exacted an alarming amount of mental strain. 
While all six members of the 155th survived, the Philippines’ debilitating environment remained 
a threat that they could never successfully eliminate. Local support was again crucial in their 
survival, since in many cases the members of the 155th were forced to either experiment (i.e., 
Decker’s operation on Mailheau’s tonsils) or consult their allies in order to counter the negative 
effects of their stay in the jungle. They were able to survive until American reinforcements 
arrived because of their local cooperation, and operated independently of any support from the 
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United States until sighting planes in October 1944. Mailheau later rendezvoused with U.S. 
forces in spring 1945 alongside Gyovai and Decker.191 
After years of desperate struggle, isolation, and physical torment, Mailheau still planned 
to remain with the army for as long as he could following his recuperation, but the long-term 
effects of his time in the Philippines had taken their toll on him. After he was reincorporated into 
the U.S. military in 1945, Mailheau continued his military career in the following years, and was 
promoted to Major in 1947 and then Lieutenant Colonel in 1953.192 Despite joining the military 
to preempt U.S. involvement in Europe, Mailheau had aspirations to continue serving for as long 
as he could, but was prevented from doing so by the physical toll of his experiences.193 Mailheau 
stated in a letter written in 1984 that he “retired (military disability) as a lieutenant colonel in 
May, 1955… I seriously planned on staying with the service till old age would force me out. 
However, the Bataan/Guerrilla experiences took their toll on me physically, and so my career 
was short lived…”194 While Mailheau did not elaborate on why he wished to do so, his 
willingness to continue his service in the U.S. army despite his experiences was remarkable, and 
another example of his willingness to persevere against adversity. However, the physical costs of 
his harsh treatment by the Japanese and his multiple bouts of severe weight loss prevented him 
from continuing, and Mailheau instead went into banking.  
 
Conclusion 
 Mailheau faced constant dangers to his physical health from 1942 to 1945, and yet his 
persistence against overwhelming hardship was intense even among the other guerrillas of the 
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155th. Most of the challenges that faced him were completely unexpected, and he improvised 
constantly in order to survive the Japanese occupation. Mailheau joined the army to avoid 
conflict, but was forced by circumstance to engage in a protracted conflict for nearly three years. 
The guerrilla war that he took part in came about by accident, following a disastrous defeat at the 
hands of the Japanese army and weeks of brutal treatment that forced Mailheau to choose 
between a potentially lethal escape and continued cruelty at the hands of Japanese soldiers. 
Despite this series of unexpected challenges, both Mailheau’s own resolve and the widespread 
help provided by those around him enabled him to take part in resistance, and ultimately survive 
the war. While he was somewhat familiar with the Negrito tribe’s relationship with the U.S. 
government, he could not have anticipated how crucial they would be in helping to resist 
Japanese rule, as well as how much they would contribute through navigation, medical aid, and 
the reinforcement of Luzon guerrillas. Filipino households contributed immeasurably, and in 
Mailheau’s case, directly saved his life following his escape from the Bataan Death March. 
Mailheau would have perished without his cooperation with the inhabitants of the Philippines or 
his own tenacity, and the combination of both allowed him to achieve far more than he would 
have been able to with one alone.  
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PRIVATE DECKER: PRIORITIZING SURVIVAL BEFORE RESISTANCE 
 
 Private Doyle Decker’s experience in the Philippines was filled with desperation and 
constant pressure from hostile patrols and an unforgiving environment. Throughout the invasion 
of the Philippines in December 1941, he carried out his orders hoping that the situation would 
improve, but it soon became clear to him that defeat was approaching as MacArthur departed and 
supplies dwindled. When he and four other soldiers retreated northwest into the mountainside 
(either towards Mt. Natib or the Mariveles Mountain Range, both pictured in Figure 4, “Map of 
Bataan mountain ranges”) after the destruction of their artillery unit, they struggled to last 
beyond the first few weeks of the Japanese occupation as they struggled to evade enemy patrols 
and scavenge for food.195 Decker was saved on numerous occasions by the sacrifices and aid of 
Filipino and Negrito civilians, and while guerrilla warfare has come to be deeply associated with 
a “home turf” mentality, Decker’s cooperation with civilians was often based on necessity as he 
and his men constantly struggled to adapt to their surroundings. Decker was primarily motivated 
by survival, and while Mailheau and Conner’s 155th unit eventually gave him an opportunity to 
participate in a larger unit, his early experiences taught him that to survive, the help of civilians 
was ultimately the most important factor. 
 
Decker’s Military Background 
 Prior to becoming a guerrilla in April 1942, Decker served as an anti-aircraft gunner with 
the 200th New Mexico National Guard, coastal artillery unit, anti-aircraft battery H.   
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Figure 4. Map of Bataan mountain ranges, including the Mariveles Mountains and Mt. Natib. 
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Decker’s motivation for enlistment was mostly to get a steady job as well as serve his 
mandatory year of military service required by the peacetime draft in September 1940.197 He 
chose March 1941 as the starting date of his draft year, after which he would either find an 
alternative job (a difficult prospect during the Great Depression) or remain in the army.198 His 
motivations were mostly pragmatic, and he chose military service to survive the Great 
Depression. While Mailheau’s goal in the Philippines was to avoid potential conflict, Decker’s 
was to avoid poverty. After training, Decker was ordered to proceed to San Francisco before 
being transported to Manila, Philippines.199 Decker seemed to have little direct input regarding 
his posting, while Bob Mailheau stated that he and some other volunteer soldiers made the 
decision to go to the Philippines themselves.200 Considering this discrepancy, while the military 
had final authority regarding military postings, the relaxed nature of peacetime allowed some to 
arrive by choice rather than by forced transfer. For Decker, however, the Philippines were 
supposed to be a temporary posting in order to provide him with a job, not a promise of hardship 
in jungle terrain for nearly three years.  
When Decker learned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he was already stationed in 
Sternburg hospital in Manila with orders to be sent back to the U.S. after contracting a tropical 
fever.201 He learned of the attack through a newspaper on the morning of December 8th, 1941, 
and the news came as a severe shock.202 While the potential for conflict had been previously 
discussed in passing, substantial proof of it was a different matter, and Decker soon feared the 
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possibility that he would never see his home again.203 He did not have long to process this 
information, as wounded soldiers began to pour in from Clark Field after it was attacked on 
December 8th. While they had received prior warning of the enemy advance due to the news 
regarding Pearl Harbor, there was little time to capitalize on this information. The destruction of 
most of the U.S. Navy the day prior meant that the possibility of naval reinforcement was now 
nonexistent, and that additional resources would be more difficult to acquire. However, the 
soldiers were not aware that most of the Pacific fleet had been lost, and only knew that Pearl 
Harbor had been attacked.204 Even barring this knowledge, the Japanese invasion on December 
8th irreversibly shifted Decker’s duties from a temporary posting to a long, bitter struggle for 
survival. As truckloads of wounded soldiers arrived from Clark Field, Decker helped to take the 
wounded into Sternburg Hospital as best he could.205 While Decker transferred to Bataan weeks 
later and continued to serve with the 200th Coastal Artillery Unit, the opening days of the 
invasion set a harrowing precedent, and the situation did not improve throughout the coming 
months.  
Wounded continued to arrive throughout December and January, and Japanese planes 
continued to strafe Manila.206 While the 200th did experience some success shooting down 
Japanese planes, it was slowly becoming clear to Decker that conditions were not improving.207 
In particular, the gradual cutting of rations and MacArthur’s retreat on March 11th were 
particularly demoralizing to Decker and the soldiers around him, and upon reflection Decker 
stated that “…when the army ordered MacArthur out, I think we all realized it was hopeless.”208 
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No matter the strategic reasoning, the removal of MacArthur could only be taken as a lack of 
confidence in the U.S. military’s ability to retain control of the islands, and it appropriately 
dampened the morale of Decker and the soldiers around him. Additionally, even direct messages 
from President Roosevelt to General Wainwright failed to give definitive instructions, and the 
military situation continued to worsen. Dwindling food supplies and a complete lack of outside 
support also failed to soothe the concerns of many soldiers now faced with operating without 
their initial commander, which significantly dampened morale.209  
These dual problems encouraged Decker and a handful of soldiers around him (notably 
his Mess Sergeant Clinton “Red” Wolf) to begin making plans to escape to the nearby 
mountainside, and began doing so well before any official news of surrender reached them. 
Decker wrote at the time, “I have decided to take to the mountains when the time comes. I will 
never surrender. I prefer to die in the mountains than to die in prison. We all feel the same way; 
we are just marking time; the surrender will come soon.”210 The hopeless tone of this entry 
stands out, as well as his description of the atmosphere around him. His attitude cannot merely 
be dismissed as individual pessimism considering his statement that the soldiers around him 
shared his feelings, and the hopelessness of defending Bataan after MacArthur’s departure drove 
several soldiers to make preparations for defeat. Interestingly, he does not mention any particular 
cruelty by the Japanese prior to this decision in his original journals, only beginning to take note 
of the atrocities that they committed as he encountered evidence of them along the way. His 
motivation for resisting was not based on any particular knowledge of Japanese cruelty, and 
instead by a more basic desire to avoid capture by any enemy party. While Japan’s wartime 
reputation has been thoroughly documented by secondary literature and the guerrillas’ own 
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accounts (especially those concerning the Death March and occupation), it was not known by 
Decker or Mailheau prior to their encounters with Japanese soldiers and tactics. In any case, once 
plans were made, Decker and Wolf began to make preparations for retreating into the mountains 
if or when news of surrender reached them, which it soon did in April 1942. 
Despite their prior preparations to store weapons in a supply cache, Decker and Wolf 
were not able to capitalize on them when they were cut off from their unit. Ironically, Decker 
and Wolf departed from their unit on the afternoon of the surrender to get cigarettes from a 
neighboring ordinance company, and later found the company overrun by Japanese forces.211 By 
the time they resolved to return to their unit, it had already become dark, and they were unable to 
successfully navigate their way back.212 When they finally managed to return, they learned that 
their unit had been overrun, but had to wait until daylight returned in order to move out.213 
Decker and Wolf eventually reunited with their battery commander and two other soldiers, and 
set out for the mountains as a group of five total as soon as possible the day after the surrender. 
While the signing of the surrender on April 9th ended official hostilities, responses from U.S. 
soldiers were a different matter, and Decker, Wolf, and others around them decided against 
surrender in any capacity. As of April 9th, however, the conflict with Japan was officially over, 
and from that point onwards, many were forced to choose either resistance or surrendering to the 
Japanese in hopes of more favorable treatment that they seldom received. Decker resolved to 
choose the former, but was faced with much more pressing problems before he could militarily 
resist, and the most pressing by far was procuring long-term food and shelter. His group of five 
had little or no training in this regard, and it nearly cost them their lives.  
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Struggle during the Opening Weeks 
 The opening weeks of the occupation were some of the most grueling for Decker and his 
four fellow soldiers (Dallas Vinette, Red Wolf, Manuel Montoya, and Nino Lucero) as they 
attempted to survive in the jungle.214 While the threat of capture or execution by Japanese 
soldiers was their first consideration, hunger and disease were equally hazardous. Despite their 
plans to flee into the mountainside prior to the surrender, neither Decker or the soldiers around 
him had any extensive survival training, and had very little time to adjust to their new situation 
before the climate and maintaining a steady supply of food became distractingly important.215 
The struggle to survive was more pressing than attempts to form any kind of long-term 
resistance, and the opening weeks of his survival in the jungle were particularly dire and 
disorganized. During the crucial opening weeks, staying alive and healthy became a grueling 
task, and before guerrilla units could be organized, Decker and his companions had to learn how 
to adapt to their surroundings and learn several crucial lessons that they would later use during 
the occupation.  
 Unsurprisingly, obtaining and maintaining a supply of food had already been one of the 
most harrowing challenges Decker faced prior to the surrender at Bataan, and this became an 
even direr issue with the dissolution of U.S. command.216 Without a steady food supply, Decker 
and fellow guerrillas struggled to procure food from their environment, which many of them 
were unfamiliar with. Even prior to the surrender, supplies dwindled within Decker’s artillery 
battery, and as the defense of Bataan progressed, it soon became clear that starvation was 
becoming a distinct possibility. Decker remarked in his journal that “… our rations are cut 
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almost daily. We have already eaten the cavalry horses and mules… How much longer can we 
hold out?”217 No matter what the tactical reality was, the Decker and Wolf did not believe that 
they could hold out much longer, and while they stayed with the battery to the best of their 
ability (even moving the battery’s kitchen multiple times), they ultimately decided to flee into 
the mountains if the situation continued to deteriorate, which it soon did.   
Conditions worsened once Decker traveled into the mountains, and inconsistent food 
supplies frequently hampered his and fellow soldiers’ ability to effectively reason with each 
other, let alone organize their efforts. Decker’s group was able to initially rely on rice during the 
first few days of their journey into the northern mountainside, but their existing supplies only 
lasted 5 days.218 Ten days into their trek through the jungle, tempers quickly flared among he and 
his fellow four soldiers as food ran desperately low.219 Throughout the initial ten days, the group 
subsisted entirely on leaves and bugs in the absence of any effective substitute (or at the very 
least, any that they were aware of).220 By the tenth day of their journey, they were forced to kill a 
wild chicken and eat it nearly raw out of sheer hunger. They were only saved when they were 
found by a passing group of three Filipinos who decided to take them in.221 While they later 
observed the eating habits of local tribesmen and learned to survive on papaya, banana, and 
coconut plants, their initial unfamiliarity with foraging in the wilderness limited the resources 
they were able to use. The opening weeks of survival in the mountains were dangerous, 
frightening, and confusing, and the thought of organizing a guerrilla unit in these conditions 
bordered on ludicrous.  
                                                 
217 Decker, Journal Entries, 9.  
218 Decker, Why I Joined the Army, 6.  
219 Ibid, 6.  
220 Decker, Explanation of Answers, 2.  
221 Ibid, 7.  
 76 
 
Organization was also made much more difficult due to the absence of formal logistics 
and a lack of preparation for guerrilla fighting, and soldiers had few definitive ways of proving 
simple information such as their former ranks in the military. Soldiers may normally have used 
dog tags for identification, but Decker also stated that many (including him) had lost their dog 
tags in the months following the fall of the Philippines, either through intentional or accidental 
neglect.222 In his specific words, “90 percent of us couldn’t have proved [sic] we was anything, 
because as I recall, I don’t even recall having any dogtags… most men I ran into, didn’t have.”223 
In this case, the abandonment of proof regarding rank was not a considered strategy, but instead 
resulted from a decrease in the value of rank following the U.S. army’s defeat. Decker’s priority 
was not to maintain the protocol and strict hierarchy of the U.S. army, but was instead to survive 
and find whatever soldiers he could that he could depend on during the occupation. In cases such 
as his later meeting with Lieutenant Henry “Clay” Conner, Decker opted to rely on his instincts 
and personal impressions, gravitating towards soldiers like Conner and Mailheau based on their 
merit instead of former rank.  
Even when identification was not an issue, partnerships were potentially unreliable, and 
even prior chains of command did not ensure success. As food began to run low five days into 
the occupation, Decker’s personal relationship with Vinette quickly soured as it became clear 
that the latter was not well suited to survival in the jungle or the dissolution of command. Decker 
described Vinette as being somewhat abrasive, and that he often insisted on being treated with 
his former degree of authority, which did little to inspire confidence as Decker’s group struggled 
to merely obtain food.224 In one poignant example, Decker stated that “Captain Vinette… 
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threatened to shoot me because I wouldn’t go fill his canteen after dark.”225 While the group 
stayed together for approximately ten days, Captain Vinette set out one morning alongside 
another soldier to scout out the terrain, and never returned.226 It is unknown if they were 
intercepted by any patrols, taken in by any other groups, or simply deserted Decker and his other 
fellow survivors, but it is certain is that they set out and failed to return, reducing the group’s 
numbers by two. While relationships between Decker and the other two soldiers who were with 
him improved shortly thereafter, Captain Vinette’s disappearance confirmed that the prior chain 
of command was not a mark of reliability, and that individual relationships would be more 
relevant to survival than adhering to the military’s codes of command and loyalty.  
Immediately following the surrender, the rules of life in Luzon completely changed. The 
chain of command was no longer a marker of reliability, rank became a secondary concern 
compared to basic necessities, and Decker and his fellow men now had to contend with a 
survival situation that they all had scarce training for. While the threat of force from Japanese 
patrols was a serious concern, the U.S. soldiers’ lack of familiarity with the terrain, foraging 
techniques, and securing shelter became much more pressing challenges after they fled into the 
jungle. While Decker, Wolf, Lucero, Vinette, and Montoya had been stationed on the island for 
months, this did not mean that they had a solid grasp of the local geography beyond the bases 
and cities that they had been stationed at, and they all began at a disadvantage as they attempted 
to evade capture or death at the hands of the Japanese forces. The line between survival and 
resistance remained thin throughout Decker’s experiences as a guerrilla, but was the narrowest 
during this initial period. While the Japanese were the invaders, this did not mean that the U.S. 
soldiers held much of an advantage in terms of knowledge or navigation, and ultimately, 
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Decker’s survival came down to the acts of a number of local groups that were able to provide 
him with important lessons about living in the jungle.  
 
Local Aid 
 The aid given to soldiers like Decker by various groups in the Philippines undeniably 
made their survival possible beyond the first few weeks of the occupation. Local planters like 
Bill and Edith Fassoth, native tribesmen in the mountains, and a range of Filipino citizens (some 
of whom had either been members of the volunteer army) all aided the 155th’s members in some 
capacity. Decker and Mailheau deeply appreciated their frequent help, remembering it decades 
after the war had concluded. It is not an overstatement to say that Decker would most certainly 
have died without their help, and he detailed specific instances of this need for help in his 
wartime journal. This help came in the form of refuges, navigational guidance, and resources 
provided by various groups throughout Central Luzon despite the best efforts of the new 
Japanese territorial government to prevent these kinds of aid. The contributions made by the 
Philippines’ inhabitants were materially and psychologically significant, and they deserve 
recognition for their part in aiding potentially hundreds of U.S. soldiers who were now trapped 
throughout Luzon.   
 Initially, there was no guarantee that local aid would be reliable or freely given, and 
tensions were high following the surrender. While some writers at the time such as Catherine 
Porter of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations were optimistic that U.S. 
promises would be valued above those of the Japanese, for the time being the U.S. had departed 
in the event of enemy attack.227 The Philippines had been militarily abandoned following 
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MacArthur’s retreat and Wainwright’s surrender, and the poor support provided to the defense of 
the Philippines did not instill confidence in the United States’ ability to make good on its prior 
promise of independence, even to its own soldiers.228 While Wainwright’s decision to surrender 
had been made based on rapidly dwindling resources and numerous defensive shortcomings, 
there was no way to accurately judge how groups in the Philippines would react in the wake of 
conquest. In reality, while some collaborated with the new Japanese government in the opening 
months, Decker and Mailheau’s accounts both reveal that there were immediate and significant 
pockets of support that provided food and shelter to U.S. soldiers throughout Central Luzon 
during not only the opening weeks, but nearly their entire stay. Regardless of this, many soldiers 
could not easily determine who was friend or foe, and the new Japanese government heavily 
encouraged collaboration. The support that Decker received, however, was not only extensive, 
but was given fewer than two weeks into the occupation.  
The housing and food that many groups in the Philippines (including both Filipino 
citizens and native tribesmen) provided were some of the most essential in the initial weeks, 
especially when soldiers like Decker or Mailheau were on death’s door. One day after Vinette’s 
aforementioned departure (when the group caught and ate a chicken nearly raw), a Filipino 
family took Decker’s group to their house just as he thought he was going mad from hunger, and 
it is no exaggeration to say that their hospitality saved Decker and his fellow men. Decker wrote,  
 
When we reach their house they begin to cook some rice. The aroma of the rice cooking 
is driving me mad. If they don’t ask me to eat I know I am going to kill them. I must have 
food. As I sit there with these awful thoughts going through my mind, I realize how 
suddenly a man can turn into an animal. Then I hear the woman say, “Come eat. We have 
cooked this for you.” How ashamed I feel. Tears come to my eyes. This is my first 
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encounter with the Filipino people. What lovely people. I know I will never forget these 
people.229 
 
At a critical moment of physical and emotional vulnerability, Decker was given another 
chance to survive, and the significance of this chance was not lost on him. Extreme survival 
conditions nearly drove him to violence, and yet he was provided with the food that he 
desperately needed mere moments before lashing out. It was not the last time that he was 
provided food or housing by Filipino citizens, but it was one of the most important cases, and 
between this instance and Mailheau’s recuperation following his time on the Bataan Death 
March, it is clear that neither man would have survived without civilian aid. The direness of the 
initial conditions that Decker and his men faced in the Philippines should not be underestimated, 
and even the gift of individual meals was crucial in ensuring their survival, especially given their 
initial unfamiliarity with foraging, finding shelter, or communicating with civilians. In Decker’s 
case, he did not speak any of the local languages (such as Tagalog and Spanish) other than 
English, had never previously lived in a jungle environment, and was very unfamiliar with the 
mountainous terrain in the region.230 There was no guarantee that other guerrillas had any of 
these skills, and there was a great need for direction and resources in order to simply survive, let 
alone evade capture or death.  
 However, the Filipinos were not the only significant group inhabiting Luzon, and even 
tribesmen in the mountains coordinated with U.S. soldiers throughout the occupation. The extent 
of support provided by one of the indigenous tribes in the Philippines (dubbed Negritos, and no 
modern name has popularly surfaced) is difficult to ascertain, but they actively organized attacks 
on Japanese forces and procured resources for both themselves and Luzon guerrillas on multiple 
                                                 
229 Ibid, 13.  
230 Malcolm Decker, Essential Commentary Made by Doyle Decker, 11. 
 81 
 
occasions. The only other name mentioned for their tribes by Decker is “Bulugas,” the Filipino 
term used at the time. Decker recalled, “I traveled the mountains a lot. As a matter of fact, I 
crossed them twice. And they [Filipinos] used to accuse me… the Filipinos called the Negritos, 
Bulugas, and they always accused me of traveling like a Buluga.”231 It is unclear whether the 
term Buluga is merely descriptive or holds a more dismissive meaning. Historically, the Negritos 
are believed to have migrated to the Philippines nearly 30,000 years ago alongside Malay tribes 
via a land bridge, and continued to live on Luzon within the mountains.232  
They were not as disorganized as their tribal structure would imply, and they served 
under a tribal Commander-In-Chief by the name of Kodario Laxamana.233 Decker and his fellow 
guerrillas often worked closely with the Negritos in order to bolster their numbers, since large 
groups comprised of Americans tended to arouse greater suspicion from Japanese patrols. 
Guerrilla leader Henry “Clay” Conner Jr. (who later personally organized the 155th guerrilla 
group, the only persistent guerrilla group that Decker was involved with) later personally sent a 
story to Life Magazine in 1949 in order to express his gratitude and regard for Kodario, who 
Conner described as a “close companion during the war (who) rallied the Negritos to organize 
Guerrilla Force 155.”234 While his accounts were generally accepted both by his comrades and 
researchers as being romanticized, Kodario’s group cooperated closely with the 155th and 
provided them with a much greater pool of manpower. Conner claimed in at least two articles 
that Kodario had personally killed 50 Japanese soldiers during the occupation before his death. 
However, in historian Dwayne Sanford’s conversations with Decker during his initial research 
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into guerrilla actions on Luzon, Sanford stated that Conner had a tendency for telling “extremely 
good stories” that had some basis in truth, but were likely exaggerated in their presentation (in all 
likelihood referring to impressive figures such as 50 alleged kills and 17 decapitations that 
Conner claimed Kodario personally carried out).235 Exaggerations aside, Kodario and the 
Negritos both significantly aided soldiers like Decker, Conner, and Mailheau, and engaged in 
active military resistance against the Japanese alongside American guerrillas.  
 There are also scattered accounts of smaller-scale help provided by Negrito tribesmen on 
Luzon, and the descriptions given by Doyle Decker indicate that while verbal communication 
with tribesmen was often limited, they formed working relationships with guerrillas on Luzon 
that directly contributed to their survival. Decker directly described his difficulties with 
communicating with the Negritos in a telephone interview decades later, during which he stated 
that he and a fellow soldier named Bob Campbell, 
 
Couldn’t have possibly told the Negritos anything, because neither one of us spoke the 
Negrito dilect [sic], and we just about half-assed spoke Tagalog, and that was just enough 
to get in trouble and not enough to get back out. And I spoke just a little bit of Spanish. 
But the only Negrito that I ever talked to outside of sign language, was to three Negritos 
that we had taught to speak English… You don’t talk to [sic] much in sign language; you 
can get what you want to keep from getting killed, I guess.236 
 
Even in the absence of reliable verbal communication, Luzon guerrillas were able to form 
close relationships with Negritos on the island, and soldiers like Conner and Decker both praised 
them for being unexpectedly and thoroughly supportive of American soldiers. When reflecting 
on his time in the Philippines, Decker stated that “We began to organize the Negritos, which 
were very primitive people but true-blue and loyal to the Americans. If there was ever a traitor 
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among the Negritos, I never heard about it.”237 Despite the help that he also received from 
Filipino families, Decker only described the Negrito tribesmen as being legitimately trustworthy, 
and Mailheau also attested to their patriotism and loyalty.238 Decker also engaged in multiple 
transactions with Negritos throughout his time in the Philippines, including at least one case in 
which he compensated them with salt to act as navigational guides.239 Accounts of these 
transactions are scattered, but Decker’s interactions were not limited to temporary deals. He also 
stayed with Negrito tribesmen for extended periods multiple times, including one stretch during 
which he stayed alongside them for at least a week at Fassoth’s Camp, a friendly camp for U.S. 
soldiers located in the mountains.240 
 Fassoth’s Camp was a refuge created by local planter Bill Fassoth along with his wife 
Edith, and it served as one of the most useful resources for Luzon guerrillas during the first few 
weeks of the occupation. The camp provided many essentials that were otherwise unavailable, 
including consistent shelter, a steadier food supply, and a location unknown to the Japanese for a 
period longer than a few days. All three of these factors were particularly important considering 
that the primary goals of many guerrillas in Central Luzon were to survive and avoid the 
Japanese in order to link up with larger units.241 Decker’s account indicates that for him and the 
soldiers around him, one of the most difficult challenges they faced was maintaining an adequate 
supply of food and lasting shelter, and the temporary camps that the soldiers created were no 
replacement for dependable housing. While it is difficult to truly determine the relative fame of 
the camp due to the chaos of occupation, Decker stated that he and another soldier were told 
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about Fassoth’s camp by other soldiers while hunting, which implies some degree of 
dissemination among American soldiers trapped on Luzon.242 In Decker’s words,  
 
We met some men who told us about Fassoth’s Camp and offered to guide us 
there…After at least a day’s travel, we came to a barrio at about noon. Our guides left us 
and went into the barrio and didn’t return until almost dark… Later on in the night we 
were awakened and told that we were leaving for Fassoth’s Camp. We walked all night 
and finally arrived at Fassoth’s later the following day.243  
 
Decker personally attested to the camp’s significance, and it helped him both to recover 
his strength and begin finding other U.S. guerrillas. He described the camp as a particularly 
helpful and welcome refuge, and even stated that the Fassoths provided aid without asking for 
anything in return save for occasional trips into the jungle to procure meat.244 Decker stated that 
the soldiers were able to stay at the camp for “several weeks” (there is no exact dating since 
information regarding time was limited), and during that time soldiers stayed alongside other 
guerrillas, Filipinos, and even Negrito tribesmen who all stayed at the camp.245 The camp hosted 
a variety of individuals, including even Catholic Priests in one case, who had presumably come 
to the camp to provide religious guidance. In one case of unfortunate misunderstanding, Decker 
clarified that he was a Baptist when asked if he needed help by one of the Priests, to which the 
priest broke into tears and replied “I am here to help everybody, not just the Catholics.”246 While 
there were smaller-scale misunderstandings like this that naturally arose from the sheer variety of 
individuals within the camp, it nevertheless served as a focal point for aid at a time when several 
different groups needed such a location. Food came from several sources (including a buck deer 
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brought in by the Negritos in at least one case), but Decker nevertheless stated that the camp was 
everything that he and his fellow group had heard that it was, and that he “always held them [the 
Fassoth Family] in the highest respect.”247  
However, the camp was eventually abandoned by Decker and other U.S. guerrillas as 
discovery by the Japanese grew more likely, and he described the departure of soldiers as a slow 
and cautious withdrawal rather than a concentrated movement. Soldiers simply began to feel that 
staying in the same location for a prolonged period was dangerous, and that they needed to move 
on before the Japanese discovered the camp. Despite his initial reservations, Decker left the 
camp alongside soldiers Bob Campbell, Henry Winslow, and Sergeant Banks (whose first name 
is not listed in Decker’s writing). Decker recalled years later that he “didn’t want to leave the 
camp but we had been warned that the camp was to be raided—twice… Also, it was getting 
harder to get supplies each day, so after telling the Fassoths good-bye early one morning… I left 
camp and headed for Olongapo.”248 While the direct warnings were sufficient cause for 
restlessness, a nagging sense of danger had weighed on Decker prior to them, and the gradual 
arrival of people that Decker described as “strange” also contributed to his decision.249 He never 
specified what he meant by this in his journal, but his description of uncertainty regarding the 
allegiances of Filipinos means that he likely became unnerved by the numbers of people coming 
into the camp, and determined that the growing likelihood of information being leaked to the 
Japanese was high enough that he needed to depart the camp.  
Decker’s fears were well founded, because the camp was indeed raided and burned 
shortly thereafter.250 He later received word that the camp was raided the night after he left, but 
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was never able to confirm it.251 He and his three fellow soldiers evaded multiple Japanese patrols 
on their way Southwest to Olongapo (roughly 30-35 miles, see Figure 5, “Wider map of Central 
Luzon”), and walked through watery areas in order to avoid leaving any tracks.252 This had the 
unfortunate side effect of rendering their feet nearly unusably sore, but they successfully evaded 
any hostile encounters and took refuge with a Filipino family in yet another critical provision of 
aid from the people of the Philippines. Japanese patrols were heavy, however, and soon the 
group of four was forced yet again to live among the Negritos in the mountains in order to evade 
capture or confrontation.253 After departing from Fassoth’s camp, shelter and travel were once 
again inconsistent and daily avoidance became the primary objective.  
Eventually, the group decided to split off due to the danger of travelling in larger 
numbers, which was a tactic used by both Decker and Mailheau in order to avoid discovery by 
enemy forces. Debate arose over who would comprise the new pairs after the split, so the group 
decided to draw straws, since it was the most impartial method they could think of.254 Decker 
and Bob Campbell were paired through this process, and they later stayed together throughout 
the rest of the occupation as part of the 155th guerrilla unit under Lieutenant Conner.255 While 
their stay at Fassoth’s camp only lasted for a brief time, it provided the environment that Decker 
and other guerrillas needed in order to compose themselves and plan ahead, and was some of the 
most important sources of food and shelter that Decker encountered in the Philippines. The camp 
was a meeting point of many different groups including runaway soldiers, tribesmen, and even 
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clergy, and played a pivotal role in allowing soldiers to meet contacts and begin organizing 
guerrilla units like the 155th.  
256 
Figure 5. Wider map of Central Luzon, including both Fassoth’s camp and Olongapo.  
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Formation of the 155th Guerrilla Unit 
 Soon after leaving Fassoth’s camp, Decker and Bob Campbell made contact with 
Lieutenant Conner, who informed them that he was considering creating a dedicated guerrilla 
unit. Decker’s contact with Conner was a major turning point, since it introduced him to a 
number of fellow guerrillas who he stayed with throughout the rest of the occupation. While it 
enabled Decker to settle in with a consistent group of soldiers, the struggle to survive remained 
severe enough that the group’s capabilities were limited. While the 155th engaged in daily 
reconnaissance work in order to coordinate with larger U.S. forces, its members were limited by 
the same environmental ills that had hindered them as individual guerrillas. While the unit’s 
resources were greater than the scope of its core six members, disease still ran rampant, and at 
times prevented Decker and Mailheau from fully functioning, let alone engaging in risky military 
reconnaissance. Decker remained with the 155th for the rest of the occupation, and despite its 
limitations, Conner’s efforts resulted in a guerrilla unit that was not eliminated or discovered 
easily by Japanese patrols that persisted until the liberation of the Philippines in fall 1945.  
Issues initially arose around the group’s formation and scope, not helped by the 
guerrillas’ frequent inability to prove their own rank. When Decker and Campbell first met 
Conner, Campbell initially questioned Conner’s legitimacy as an officer despite Decker’s 
indication that they would have been similarly unable to prove their identities.257 They ultimately 
decided to follow Conner to his camp, and finally rendezvoused with a prospective guerrilla unit. 
Among the group was Bob Mailheau, who Decker quickly formed a close friendship with.258 
While the opening months of 1942 were defined by extraordinary hardship and an almost 
constant risk of starvation or capture, Decker engaged in much more consistent intelligence work 
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following the creation of Conner’s unit, which later became known as the 155th Guerrilla 
Squadron.259 Though the unit only directly consisted of six men (Conner, Mailheau, Gyovai, 
Donahey, Decker, and Campbell), the group’s membership also functionally extended to allied 
Negritos and was the most persistent organized group that Decker encountered, lasting until the 
end of the occupation in 1945. While the 155th Guerrilla Squadron could never address all of the 
risks and problems of the occupation, it did introduce a degree of stability for Decker that had 
not been available prior to its formation, and was a key contributor to the survival of the men 
who formed it.  
 Around the same time that Decker and Bob Campbell made contact with Conner, they 
attempted to organize Negrito resistance against the Japanese occupation, despite their limited 
ability to meaningfully communicate.260 Decker and Campbell taught three Negrito brothers to 
speak English, which was ultimately the limit of their communication outside of limited Tagalog 
and sign language.261 Just as it was forming defense networks throughout surrounding barrios, 
the 155th continued to cooperate with Negrito tribesmen, and they continued to receive guidance, 
shelter, food, and even medicine from the Negritos. While cooperation with mountain tribesmen 
may seem like a risky proposition, they were actually one of the more patriotic groups in the 
Philippines, and Decker stated that while “Some (Filipinos) we can trust, some maybe not… the 
Negritos... were very primitive people but true-blue and loyal to the Americans.”262 Decker 
emphatically and consistently vouched for their loyalty, and continued to sporadically live and 
work among them even after joining Conner’s unit. As mentioned previously, Decker was 
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sometimes accused of traveling like a Negrito through the mountains, and the Negritos’ methods 
inspired some of the other travel and survival techniques used by Decker and his fellow 
guerrillas.263 U.S. guerrillas and Negrito tribesmen also successfully exchanged medical 
techniques on multiple occasions, and engaged in medical procedures in order to heal each other.   
 Decker and Mailheau’s role in the 155th mostly consisted of intelligence gathering, and 
their location around Banaba enabled them to do so in the lowlands while relaying information to 
Conner at the main headquarters.264 Even with a pool of six men to work with, the group’s role 
never really expanded beyond intelligence, due to both limited resources, an overwhelming 
military disadvantage, and a refusal by the U.S. military to provide additional weapons. Decker 
requested weaponry from the U.S. army just prior to the reclamation of the Philippines to prevent 
Japanese incursions into the nearby mountains, but was denied due to fears of interception by the 
Hukbalahap group, which had already occurred in April 1942.265 Decker personally believed that 
the group could have been capable of completely removing the Japanese presence from the 
surrounding mountains, but the 155th was never granted the opportunity. Considering the 
consistent reluctance and caution that Decker had exercised throughout the occupation, his claim 
was likely more than brazen speculation, but nevertheless his guerrilla unit was never given the 
chance to prove or refute him. The 155th continued to gather information until the U.S. invasion 
of Lingayen Gulf in January 1945, which was the beginning of the U.S. reclamation of the 
Philippines from Japan.  
 Despite an increased access to limited medicine, disease and nutritional issues continued 
to hound the unit. Malaria and dysentery were especially frequent during the rainy seasons, and 
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posed a significant problem alongside the limited mobility that was often caused by intense 
rainfall.266 Medicine was limited, and nearly all of the 155th’s members incurred a serious 
ailment throughout their time of operation. Decker and Mailheau both contracted dysentery, 
incurring additional fatigue, capacity for disease, and a dangerous lack of appetite in an 
environment with food that was already limited mostly to papayas, bananas, and mangos, with 
very little access to meat.267 Mailheau additionally suffered from a tonsil infection, which 
completely incapacitated him. Fellow member Frank Gyovai nearly perished after contracting 
pneumonia, and was only saved by a medicinal ritual conducted by Negritos.268 Nearly all of 
these diseases once again shifted focus to survival, and severely limited the ability of the 
guerrillas to even engage in self-defense, let alone conduct reconnaissance. No amount of 
organization could alter the climate or patterns of disease, and while the members of the 155th 
were lucky enough to survive their afflictions, they did so only after coming dangerously close to 
death at the hands of their environment.  
 
Withdrawal from the Philippines 
Decker’s first recollection of returning U.S. forces was September 21st, 1944, when he 
sighted American planes flying overhead as both he and Mailheau struggled with disease.269 The 
mere sight of American planes boosted morale, and even though he did not observe or describe 
any decisive offensive action from the planes, the promise of the U.S. military’s return inspired 
both Decker and Mailheau to continue their efforts of survival and information gathering.270 The 
                                                 
266 Decker, Journal Entries, 37.  
267 Ibid, 35, 39.  
268 Ibid, 37.  
269 Decker, Why I Joined the Army, 16. 
270 Ibid, 16.  
 92 
 
U.S. military’s reclamation of the Philippines effectively began about a month afterwards on 
October 20th, 1944, when a massive invasion force began conducting landings after efforts to 
conduct air reconnaissance throughout the preceding months.271 The 155th’s other avenue of 
information regarding military plans was a downed Navy pilot named Henry Hogan, who was 
also the only pilot that they were able to rendezvous with throughout the occupation.272 He 
informed them of the American forces’ basic plans, and both where and when they could be 
expected to arrive.273 
 Due to this information, the 155th had ample time to consider and plan around the 
American invasion of the Philippines in fall 1944, and their main concerns were surviving for the 
duration of the American reclamation and re-connecting with official U.S. military forces. While 
the return of American planes brought tremendous hope and promises of liberation, they also 
provided a newfound sense of danger. Decker expressed fear at the thought of being killed by a 
friendly American air strike, especially as the U.S. military presence continued to intensify.274 
Air strikes had become nearly daily as 1944 progressed, and the thought of death at the hands of 
American planes after surviving horrible conditions for nearly two and a half years was as real as 
fears of death at the hands of Japanese patrols. Luckily, none of the 155th were killed by friendly 
fire, but Decker’s fears were well founded as the number of friendly air strikes continued to 
escalate. When the 155th received word that American forces landed at Lingayen Gulf, they 
began to make preparations to rejoin them while resolving to hold their position until evacuation 
orders were given.275  
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 Even near the end of the war, conditions were still dangerous enough to necessitate 
extreme caution. Japanese forces were in the midst of mounting a desperate defense, and 
continued to resist the American reclamation any way that they could. As military pressure from 
the U.S. continued to grow, Japanese forces began to destroy fuel dumps in order to hinder the 
American advance, and considering Japan’s critical reliance on former resources, this move was 
motivated more by desperation than by the resource extraction that their military had previously 
depended on.276 Even near the end, however, Japanese patrols were a constant danger for Decker 
and the men around him. They received orders to avoid Japanese forces at all costs, and took 
refuge in a Barrio in order to stay the night and reconnect with U.S. forces the next day. The 
night that they stayed, however, a Japanese patrol entered the barrio, resulting in the death of a 
Japanese soldier and the wounding of two American guerrillas.277 While the incident did not 
result in an American fatality, it was still a brutal reminder that death was determined in a matter 
of moments, and that even as U.S. forces reclaimed the Philippines, they could not afford to be 
caught off guard.  
 After their last encounter with a Japanese patrol, Decker’s group managed to successfully 
rendezvous with American forces near the city of Angeles, which had been a popular spot for 
soldiers on leave prior to the war. In the process, they departed from their Negrito allies, and 
Decker described it as a “tearful good-bye” after the two years that they had worked closely with 
both him and the other members of the 155th.278 The rendezvous with American forces went 
without incident, and Decker’s group caught the attention of friendly planes by waving an 
American flag tied to a stick, after which they were joined by a squad of infantry.279 Their time 
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as guerrillas ended just prior to June 1945, though they did not immediately depart from the 
Philippines. In June 1945, Decker and Mailheau (who somehow managed to stay together 
throughout the entire process) flew to Manila, then Saipan in the Mariana Islands, and eventually 
to Honolulu, Hawaii before finally being flown stateside to San Francisco.280 Finally after 
reaching stateside, Decker flew to Springfield, Missouri, where he remained until being 
discharged from the military on April 26th, 1946.281 
 
Conclusion 
 Decker’s struggle was defined by constant necessity and hardship, as well as the 
consistent support that he received from the Philippines’ inhabitants along the way. He joined the 
U.S. military in order to become financially stable and quietly serve the term of his draft, not to 
take revenge against Germany or Japan as many did following the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Despite his best efforts to prepare for the worst, he was cut off from larger numbers of U.S. 
troops by an ill-timed excursion rather than any conscious decision to leave, but subsisted with 
his best efforts. He nearly starved on multiple occasions, contracted a number of harrowing 
diseases, and struggled to endure the harsh conditions of the Philippines in a climate and 
landscape that he was unfamiliar with, only saved by cooperation from fellow soldiers and by the 
generosity of the Filipinos and Negritos who harbored him. Without the planters, tribesmen, and 
families who willingly gave him food and shelter time and time again, it is extremely unlikely 
that he would have survived, and the number of times that he escaped contact with Japanese 
patrols by mere hours was a constant reminder of the pressure that the Japanese government was 
able to put on guerrillas attempting to resist their rule. His experiences prove that despite 
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common traits, guerrilla warfare is not a set of absolute tenets, and that the struggle to survive 
takes priority above weakening the enemy, striking targets, or making plans to instill a new 
government. Death was a constant threat, and the relationships that he formed with other 
guerrillas and the inhabitants of Luzon was one of the only advantages that kept him alive.  
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ENDURING LESSONS, NEW PERSPECTIVES 
 
 Imperial Japanese doctrine correctly assumed that local cooperation and the flow of 
information were both incredibly important to its expansion, but these factors held true in the 
Philippines to its detriment.282 Local cooperation was one of the most important factors 
contributing to the Luzon guerrillas’ continued survival, and examples of this are prevalent 
throughout Mailheau and Decker’s accounts. From Mailheau’s rescue and months of aided 
recovery after escaping the Bataan Death March to the provision of food and housing to Decker 
in moments of near-madness, the people of the Philippines demonstrated a willingness to 
sacrifice their own resources and time in order to keep U.S. soldiers alive, and their importance 
in ensuring that guerrilla conflict persisted should not be understated.283 Even when civilians in 
the Philippines were unwilling to directly participate in military conflict, their roles in relaying 
information and providing shelter allowed groups like the 155th to expand far beyond their 
physical scope and last until the war’s end. Without help from individuals and groups like the 
Fassoths, Filipino volunteer army, Kodario Laxamana, or Negrito tribesmen, guerrilla resistance 
in Central Luzon would have been far more limited and may very well have expired before 1944, 
let alone the end of the war.   
 
Decker and Mailheau’s Experiences 
 Decker and Mailheau’s accounts repeatedly emphasize one critical part of guerrilla 
warfare: without civilian cooperation, resistance would have proven impossible. Both men nearly 
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died on multiple occasions, and often survived only through the heroism and sacrifices of several 
families and groups throughout Luzon. Without the contributions that many made during the 
opening days of the Japanese occupation, Mailheau would most likely have died miles away 
from the Death March of complete exhaustion, and Decker would have perished from starvation 
or disease as he struggled to adapt to his environment during the opening weeks of his survival in 
the jungle. Without the guides who volunteered to help Decker, he and his group may well have 
wandered aimlessly through Central Luzon until they perished at the hands of an enemy patrol or 
wasted away from hunger. Finally, without the help that the 155th received from the barrio 
intelligence networks that they created, the group would not have been able to persist for as long 
as it did or meaningfully expand beyond its membership of six, who working alone would have 
been extremely limited in their capabilities.  
Oftentimes, Decker and Mailheau had more positive experiences interacting with Filipino 
and Negrito leaders than with other U.S. soldiers. While it was clear that loyalty did not 
universally shift towards either the U.S. or Japan, the number of times that Decker was able to 
take refuge in local homes throughout Luzon was remarkable.284 Mailheau became convinced 
that the guerrilla movement and Philippine population depended on each other for survival, 
especially in the wake of his experiences during the Death March. Mailheau and especially 
Decker received constant aid and direction from sympathetic individuals, and in many cases 
could not expect the same degree of cooperation from other groups of U.S. soldiers. Tensions ran 
high during the occupation, and along the way several smaller groups of U.S. guerrillas either 
quarreled with each other or kept their distance out of a fear of limited supplies or enemy spies. 
This paranoia caused soldiers to behave irrationally, refusing to link with other groups or even 
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threatening to use force against fellow American guerrillas in desperation.285 This meant that the 
Philippine citizenry had a direct role in deciding the fates of several guerrillas, and while they 
could not be universally depended on, in many cases Decker and Mailheau had little choice.  
Uncertainty was widespread in Central Luzon, especially in matters of intelligence and 
allegiance, which meant that cooperation became extremely valuable. By aiding the resistance 
effort, the people of the Philippines gave credence to Mailheau’s theory that for the islands to 
continue unhindered by Japanese rule, guerrillas and civilians would have to engage in a mutual 
relationship of information and aid. While the guerrilla units were able to provide rallying points 
for anti-Japanese sentiment, civilians directly engaged in the information-gathering that these 
units needed to counter the superior numbers and organizational reach of the new Philippine-
Japanese government.286 By tracking Japanese movements and military presence through civilian 
reports, guerrillas were better able to either avoid combat or wait for more favorable 
circumstances before engaging the enemy, which was invaluable when resources were not 
widely available to the guerrillas. Civilian intelligence expanded the 155th, a group primarily 
comprised of six American soldiers desperately trying to merely survive in a tropical 
environment, into a much more extensive organization capable of enduring the length of the 
occupation and making contact with other local sources of resistance.   
 The 155th’s experiences show that contrary many of the “home turf” perceptions of 
guerrilla warfare, U.S. soldiers had no formal survival training, and were initially reliant on 
assistance from sympathetic civilians. Simply put, Decker and the other soldiers around him like 
Wolf had no idea how to survive in the jungle environment of Central Luzon without proper 
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backup or guidance, and nearly ran themselves in circles trying to navigate the terrain.287 Food-
gathering also went poorly, and Decker’s group nearly starved as they tried to survive with their 
remaining rations and whatever they could scavenge from the environment.288 While the 
Japanese were the invading party, this did not mean that the guerrillas were more familiar with 
the Philippines’ geography or resources. The process was not as simple as asking for survival 
lessons, but the functions that civilians served as navigators, providers of housing and food, and 
even soldiers helped Decker survive well beyond the opening weeks of the occupation and 
eventually operate with some modicum of efficiency in the jungle.289 
 There are many obvious flaws with exclusively using primary accounts to analyze 
guerrilla warfare, but oftentimes the human core of it is lost in secondary analysis. While there 
are common markers and definitions, guerrilla units are comprised of human beings. In the case 
of the 155th, members lacked any degree of formal guerrilla training. While the common image 
of the guerrilla soldier conjures feelings of rugged individuality, strategic raids, and ideological 
causes, these traits do not effectively apply to the experiences that I have described. Cooperation 
was necessary, strikes were limited in favor of evasion and intelligence, and the 155th did not 
fight to create a new government or take any administrative control over Central Luzon. The 
thoughts of fear, isolation, and paranoia present in Decker and Mailheau’s accounts are much 
more direct than in more detached analyses, and while this detachment can make it easier to 
analyze the big picture of the war in the Philippines, it also communicates the tremendous losses 
that the U.S. suffered in the defense of Bataan less effectively. Personal accounts are beneficial 
because they maintain the human elements of history, especially within complex situations like 
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the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Taken with the proper degree of care, they can act as 
an excellent supplement to the existing history, and there needs to be more personalized accounts 
of history that are analyzed for their unique content and not merely relegated to historical fiction.  
 
Final Conclusion 
 Mailheau and Decker’s stories reveal that relationships with the local populace are some 
of the most important elements of guerrilla warfare, and that information can make the difference 
between success and failure. Relationships with local populations are still incredibly important in 
modern U.S. military operations, and the 155th’s story provides several reason as to why. The 
group was directly saved by intervention from local households and families in several instances 
and continued to build upon and create new relationships throughout the rest of their time in 
Central Luzon. The contributions that Mailheau and Decker received in the opening weeks were 
what enabled them to survive and find other like-minded soldiers like Conner and Gyovai, and 
cooperation with Filipino and Negrito populations was more important than ever after the 155th 
guerrilla unit’s formation. Through information networks and cooperation with several groups, 
the unit enabled all six members with the support that they needed to survive and eventually 
return home. Decker and Mailheau’s experiences were desperate and rife with uncertainty, but 
through their relationships with the people of Central Luzon, they were able to survive and attest 
to the sacrifices that were made so that they could live through three years of isolation and 
conflict. 
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